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I. INTRODUCTION
In view of the increasing public focus on drunk driving and the resulting
pressure on law enforcement officers to remedy the problem, it is likely that
many attorneys will come into contact with their state's DWI laws. This
Comment is intended to give an overview of the intoxication-related state
laws currently in effect in Missouri. In addition, some of the issues which
have been raised in applying the statutes will be highlighted.
It should first be noted that an intoxication-related arrest may give rise
to two separate proceedings.' A person may be subject to criminal or quasi-
criminal prosecution for violation of a state statute or municipal ordinance.
In addition, civil or administrative penalties may be imposed. The two pro-
ceedings are for the most part independent of each other; however, the issues
involved in each often overlap. 2
II. CRIMINAL TREATMENT OF INTOXICATION-RELATED OFFENSES.
A. Overview of the Statutes and Their Validity
The Missouri legislature has provided for two separate criminal offenses
relating to the operation of a motor vehicle following the consumption of
alcohol. First, section 577.010 provides that "[a] person commits the crime
of 'driving while intoxicated' [DWI] if he operates a motor vehicle while in
an intoxicated or drugged condition." 3 "Intoxicated condition" is defined
by statute as being "under the influence of alcohol, a controlled substance,
or drug, or any combination thereof."'4 Chemical analysis showing a blood-
1. See Tolen v. Missouri Dep't of Revenue, 564 S.W.2d 601, 602 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1978).
2. Id.; see also Strode v. McNeill, 725 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
3. Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.010(1) (1986).
4. Id. § 577.001(2) (1986). It might be noted that there is no statutory re-
quirement of an "impaired condition." The standard for "intoxication" is merely
"under the influence of alcohol" or drugs. For further discussion, see infra notes
73-75 and accompanying text.
Police interview form sheets often contain the question, "Are you under the
influence of an alcoholic beverage now?" Potential arrestees should be cautioned
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alcohol level of .10 percent or higher is considered prima facie evidence of
intoxication at the time of the test.5
The second possible offense is outlined in section 577.012, entitled
"Driving with excessive blood alcohol content" [BAC]. A person commits
this crime if he "operates a motor vehicle in this state with ten-hundredths
of one percent [.10 percent] or more by weight of alcohol in his blood. ' 6
The prohibited percentage "may be shown by chemical analysis of the per-
son's blood, breath, saliva, or urine.
'
"1
Although the two statutes appear to prohibit nearly identical conduct,
the proof required for conviction and the consequences of conviction are not
the same. In order to convict a person of a BAC offense, the State must
show through an approved chemical test that the person had at least .10
percent alcohol in his blood at the time he was driving.8 Under the DWI
statute, proof of intoxication does not require any specific blood-alcohol
level, nor even that any chemical analysis have been performed.9 The State
may instead choose to rely upon the opinion testimony of witnesses to prove
that the accused was "intoxicated."' 10 Because of this evidentiary distinction,
the courts have concluded that a BAC is not a lesser included offense of
driving while intoxicated."
The penalties and consequences of a conviction under each of the statutes
also differ considerably. A first offense DWI is a class B misdemeanor,
12
punishable by a fine not to exceed $5001 and/or imprisonment for a term
5. Id. § 577.037(1) (1986). Under Mo. REv. STAT. § 564.442 (1969), a blood
alcohol level of .15%V0 or higher constituted prima facie evidence of intoxication.
6. Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.012(1) (1986).
7. Id. § 577.012(2).
8. State v. Watts, 601 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Mo. 1980); see also State v. Bush,
595 S.W.2d 386, 390 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
9. Watts, 601 S.W.2d at 619; see also Bush, 595 S.W.2d at 390.
10. Bush, 595 S.W.2d at 390; State v. Walker, 588 S.W.2d 726, 727-28 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1979); State v. Valerius, 672 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); see
also infra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
11. E.g., State v. Blumer, 546 S.W.2d 790 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977). The test for
determining "whether an offense is a lesser included offense of another is to compare
the essential elements of both offenses." Id. at 791. If all of the elements of the
"lesser offense" coincide with some of the elements of the more serious offense, the
test is satisfied. Because a DWI does not require proof of a blood alcohol level of
.10%70 or higher, a BAC is not a lesser included offense. Id. at 791-92. See also Bush,
595 S.W.2d at 390 ("The statutes lack the necessary common element required to
make one a lesser included offense of the other."). One consequence of this conclusion
is that a person charged with DWI is not entitled to a jury instruction on a BAC
offense, which would have less severe penalties upon conviction.
12. Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.010(2) (1986). This section further provides that a
person who pleads or is found guilty of DWI shall not be granted a suspended
imposition of sentence unless they are placed on probation for at least two years.
13. Id. § 560.016(1)(2).
19871
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not to exceed six months.' 4 In addition, the Director of Revenue will assess
eight points against the person's license. 5 A driver who has accumulated
eight points within an eighteen month period will have his license suspended
for a period of thirty days, followed by a sixty day period with restricted
driving privileges.' 6 A first BAC offense is a class C misdemeanor,'7 for
which a person may be fined up to $30018 and/or imprisoried for not more
than fifteen days.' 9 Six points will be assessed against the person's license
following conviction.
20
The constitutionality of this statutory scheme was upheld in State v.
Watts.21 The defendant in Watts argued that the DWI and BAC statutes
prohibited the same conduct and therefore the disparity in potential punish-
ments was constitutionally invalid. Based upon this premise, the defendant
first argued that the later enactment of the BAC statute repealed the earlier
DWI law by implication. The Missouri Supreme Court rejected this argument
and reaffirmed that the two statutes "do not necessarily deal with the same
conduct."2' The court found that the re-enactment of the DWI statute in the
"new Criminal Code" indicated the absence of legislative intent to repeal
the section, and the coexistence of the statutes was upheld.
2 3
The defendant in Watts also argued that because the statutes prohibited
the same conduct, the coexistence of the statutes permitted excessive prose-
cutorial discretion in determining which charge to file. The defendant claimed
14. Id. § 558.011(l)(6).
15. Id. § 302.302(l)(7).
16. Id. §§ 302.304(2), (4). This is a special suspension period for points as-
sessed following an intoxication-related conviction. These statutes further provide
that a second DWI, or a first DWI following a prior conviction for a BAC, will
result in 12 points against such person's license. Id. § 302.302(l)(8). A driver who
has accumulated 12 points within a 12 month period will have his license revoked
for I year; if such person does not file proof of financial responsibility in accordance
with Chapter 303, the revocation period will be 2 years. Id. § 302.304(6). For further
discussion of administrative penalties, see infra notes 296-325 and accompanying text.
17. Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.012(3) (1986).
18. Id. § 560.016(l)(3).
19. Id. § 558.011(1)(7).
20. Id. § 302.302(l)(9). This statute further provides that a second BAC or
a first BAC following a prior conviction for DWI will result in 12 points being assessed
against such person's license. Id. § 302.302(8). For further discussion, see supra note
16; infra notes 296-325 and accompanying text.
21. 601 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. 1980).
22. Id. at 619. The court supported this conclusion by pointing out that a
conviction for DWI could occur despite the absence of the blood alcohol level required
for a BAC. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
23. Watts, 601 S.W.2d at 620. The court wrote that it "is not enough to show
that the statutes produce differing results when applied to the same factual situation.
Rather, the legislative intent to repeal must be manifest in the 'positive repugnancy
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that his due process and equal protection rights were implicated by the lack
of clear statutory guidelines and the prosecutor's use of arbitrary and un-
reasonable criteria. The court also rejected this argument, noting that
"[w]hether to prosecute and what charge to file . . . generally rest[s] in the
prosecutor's discretion .... [W]hen an act violates more than one criminal
statute, the Government may prosecute under either so long as it does not
discriminate against any class of defendants." 24 The court held that the DWI
and BAC statutes are of general application and operate equally upon the
citizens of Missouri.
Case law establishing the proper criteria for prosecutors to consider in
determining whether to charge an accused with DWI or a BAC is sparse.
The statutes provide no further guidance than the minimum evidentiary re-
quirements.Y In Watts, the prosecutor stated that he had considered the
defendant's driving record and his conduct at the time of arrest, and these
were held to be permissible factors. 26 The Missouri Supreme Court stated
that "[t]he prosecutor may be influenced by the penalties available upon
conviction, but this fact standing alone does not give rise to a violation of
the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses.... The Equal Protection
Clause prohibits selective enforcement 'based upon an unjustified standard
such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification.' 27
It appears, therefore, that so long as there is a chemical test showing a
blood alcohol level of .10 percent or higher, the prosecutor has considerable
discretion in determining which charge to file and prosecute. It is likely that
this discretion is very useful in encouraging plea bargaining from defendants
who prefer to opt for the less severe penalties of a BAC.
B. Issues at Trial
The elements which the State must prove in order to convict an accused
are similar for both of the intoxication-related offenses. In either prosecution,
the State must show that the defendant operated or had physical control
over a motor vehicle.7 For a DWI, there must be further proof that he was
in an intoxicated or drugged condition while doing so.29 In a BAC prose-
cution, the State need only present evidence that the defendant had a blood-
24. Id. (quoting Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 123); see also State v. Jackson, 643
S.W.2d 74, 77 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
25. See Mo. Rnv. STAT. §§ 577.010-.012 (1986); see also infra notes 28-30
and accompanying text.
26. State v. Watts, 601 S.W.2d 617, 621 (Mo. 1980).
27. Id. (quoting Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 123-25) (citation omitted).
28. Mo. Rnv. STAT. §§ 577.010-.012 (1986); see also State v. Dodson, 496
S.W.2d 272, 273 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
29. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 577.010 (1986).
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alcohol level of .10 percent or higher at the time he was driving.30
1. Challenges to Whether the Defendant was Driving.
Because operation or control over a motor vehicle is an element of both
DWI and BAC offenses, this may be an issue under either charge. Challenges
can be grouped into two main categories: (a) the defendant may claim that
he was not the person driving the vehicle, or (b) he may dispute the allegation
that he was actually operating a vehicle at the relevant time.
a. Identity of the Person Driving.
If the defendant is observed in or around the driver's seat, a claim that
someone else was driving is not likely to be successful. 31 This is due largely
to the rule that "[a]ny fact can be established by circumstantial evidence.
... The circumstances must be such as are inconsistent with defendant's
innocence, but it is not necessary that they be absolutely conclusive of his
guilt."'3
If the defendant is not seen in the car, nor actually seen driving, the
State may find it more difficult to prove that the defendant was the person
driving. The defendant in State v. Kennedy 3 was found outside of his car
in an intoxicated condition and was thereafter arrested by the police. There
were no witnesses who could testify that they had seen the defendant either
in the car or driving, or who knew how long he had been at the arrest
location. The appellate court reversed his conviction for DWI because "there
[was] nothing to indicate when, if ever, he operated the vehicle." 34
b. Definition of "Operating a Motor Vehicle"
A person may be convicted of an intoxication-related driving offense
even if the vehicle was not actually observed in motion. These cases generally
involve situations where the defendant was found in an intoxicated condition
30. Id. § 577.012.
31. See, e.g., State v. Delaney, 675 S.W.2d 105 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). In
Delaney, the defendant claimed that he was sharing a seat with his girlfriend who
was driving. The police officer testified that while following the van he saw a person
with a red sleeve in the driver's seat, and that upon stopping the vehicle, the defendant
was the only person wearing red and was alone in the driver's seat. These facts were
found sufficient to establish that the defendant was the person driving the vehicle.
Id. at 106.
32. Id. (Citation omitted).
33. State v. Kennedy, 530 S.W.2d 479 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
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in a parked car. In Kansas City v. Troutner,35 the defendant was found asleep
behind the wheel of. his car; the vehicle was in park, but the motor was
running. The state statute in effect at that time only prohibited the operation
of a motor vehicle while intoxicated. 36 The defendant, however, was charged
with violation of a municipal ordinance which prohibited both operating and
being in actual physical control of a vehicle while in such condition. 37 The
court rejected the defendant's argument that the ordinance was ambiguous
and held that "actual physical control of a vehicle results, even though the
machine merely stands motionless, so long as a person keeps the vehicle in
restraint or in a position to regulate its movements." 38
In State v. O'Toole,39 thedefendant was found asleep behind the wheel
of his automobile which was in park with the engine running and the lights
on. The definition of "operating" in the state statute had been amended by
this time to include "being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle."40
In construing the current statute, the Missouri Supreme Court adopted the
definition applied in Troutner and held that the defendant "was in a position
to regulate the vehicle's movements and was therefore 'operating' the motor
vehicle .... ,41
More recent case lav indicates that the engine of the vehicle must have
been running in order to find that defendant operated the vehicle or was in
"a position to regulate its movements." ' 42 An unsuccessful attempt to start
a car has been held not to constitute "operation" of the vehicle. 43 So long
as the engine is running, however, a person will be deemed to be in actual
physical control of the car, even if he is found sitting on the passenger side
of the vehicle. 44
c. Admissions on Issue of Driving -
The Corpus Delicti Rule.
In a criminal trial, an uncorroborated extrajudicial confession or ad-
mission may not be used as evidence of guilt unless the State establishes the
35. City of Kansas City v. Troutner, 544 S.W.2d 295 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
36. Mo. REv. STAT. § 564.440 (1969).
37. KANSAs Crry, Mo., OwnNA'cE § 34.116 (1984).
38. Troutner, 544 S.W.2d at 300. It might also be noted that the defendant's
car was parked in a private lot. Noting the proximity of the parking lot to the public
streets, the court rejected the defendant's argument that Kansas City did not have
the authority to extend the sanction to private property.
39. State v. O'Toole, 673 S.W.2d 25 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
40. Mo. Rv. STAT. § 577.001(1) (Supp. 1982).
41. O'Toole, 673 S.W.2d at 27.
42. State v. Liebhart, 707 S.W.2d 427, 429-30 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) ("a car
which is not running cannot be restrained nor have its movements regulated"); cf.
State v. Hoeber, 737 S.W.2d 484 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
43. Liebhart, 707 S.W.2d at 429-30.
44. Taylor v. McNeill, 714 S.W.2d 947, 948 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). The court
noted that "[w]hile he may not have been in the most convenient position relative
to the car's operative controls, they remained within easy reach." Id.
19871
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essential elements of the corpus delicti.45 The term corpus delicti means the
"body of the crime." Thus, in a DWI prosecution, the State is required
to provide proof, independent of the confession, that (1) someone was op-
erating the vehicle, and (2) that the person was in an intoxicated condition
while doing so. 47
Most of the cases raising the corpus delicti issue involve situations where
the defendant was not observed inside the vehicle or not seen actually driving.4
If the State cannot establish the corpus delicti, an out of court admission by
the defendant that he was driving will not be admissible. 49 However, this
burden is not as difficult as it sounds.
The corpus delicti rule has been held not to require full proof of the
body of the offense.50 It is enough if there is independent evidence of cir-
cumstances which correspond to the circumstances related in the defendant's
statement.5' In addition, the corroborating circumstances and the confession
may be considered together in determining whether the corpus delicti was
established.' 2 Finally, the State is not required to prove the defendant's con-
nection with the crime he is charged with in order to establish the corpus
delicti.53
45. E.g., State v. Johnson, 670 S.W.2d 552, 554 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Kansas
City v. Verstraete, 481 S.W.2d 615, 616-17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972). It should be noted
that in civil or administrative proceedings, the corpus delicti rule does not apply;
therefore, admissions or statements by the defendant are admissible. See, e.g., Tuggle
v. Director of Revenue, 727 S.W.2d 168, 169-70 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Tolen v.
Missouri Dep't of Revenue, 564 S.W.2d 601, 602 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
46. W. LAFAvE & A. Scotn, HANDBOOK ON C nnNA LAw § 4 (1972). Some
courts and commentators have stated that corpus delicti "consists of two elements:
(1) proof, direct or circumstantial, that the specific loss or injury charged occurred,
and (2) someone's criminality as the cause of the loss or injury." E.g., id.; Johnston,
670 S.W.2d at 554. The Johnston court noted, however, that "[t]hese principles...
are not easily applied in prosecutions for offenses arising out of the operation of
motor vehicles." Id.
47. See, e.g., State v. Friesen, 725 S.W.2d 638, 640 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987);
State v. Easley, 515 S.W.2d 600, 602 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974).
48. E.g., State v. Cook, 711 S.W.2d 208 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (defendant
changing tire); Johnston, 670 S.W.2d 552 (defendant inside car attempting to drive
out of ditch); State v. Davison, 668 S.W.2d 252 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (defendant
standing outside car which was stuck in a ditch); Verstraete, 481 S.W.2d 615 (defen-
dant standing in a crowd, 50 to 75 feet away from his car).
49. See Verstraete, 481 S.W.2d at 617.
50. E.g., id.; Davison, 668 S.W.2d at 254.
51. E.g., Cook, 711 S.W.2d at 209; State v. Whitely, 512 S.W.2d 840, 843
(Mo. Ct. App. 1974); Verstraete, 481 S.W.2d at 617.
52. E.g., Verstraete, 481 S.W.2d at 617. In State v. Easley, 515 S.W.2d 600,
602 (Mo. Ct5. App. 1984), the court pointed out that "[t]here is no hard and fast
rule that evidence of the corpus delicti must precede the admission of defendant, so
long as the essential elements of the crime are provided by the end of the trial."
53. State v. Johnston, 670 S.W.2d 552, 554 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
[Vol. 52
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Circumstances which corroborate the defendant's admission may be shown
by direct or circumstantial evidence. A review of the cases indicates that the
courts are not particularly strict in this area. In State v. Cook the defendant
was changing a tire on the side of the road. A passerby stopped to help and
later testified that there was a person in the passenger seat, and that the
defendant got in and out of the driver's seat twice without adjusting the seat.
This evidence was determined to be sufficient independent evidence to admit
the defendant's statement that he had a blowout.55 This was enough to es-
tablish that the defendant drove the vehicle. In State v. Easley 56 the defen-
dant was initially seen standing near his car which had been involved in an
accident. Two witnesses testified that the defendant was at the scene, and
that he accepted the keys from a person who had moved the car to the side
of the road. This evidence sufficiently confirmed the defendant's statement
that he had been driving so as to make the confession admissible.17
The corpus delicti can also be established by circumstantial evidence.
For example, in State v. Johnston58 the police observed the defendant trying
to move his car out of a ditch. There were skid marks on the road and also
some damage to a nearby fence. The court determined that there was suf-
ficient independent evidence to establish that someone was driving the car,
lost control and skidded off the road. The defendant's statement that he had
lost control due to the wet pavement was sufficiently corroborated so as to
be admissible.59
One of the few cases in which the corpus delicti was held not to have
been established is Kansas City v. Verstraete.60 In that case, the police had
been called to an accident scene. The defendant was initially seen in a nearby
crowd of people. He told the police that he had been driving but stated that
he did not think he had hit anything. Following a field sobriety test, the
defendant was arrested for DWI. The court of appeals reversed his conviction
on the grounds that the corpus delicti had not been sufficiently established
54. 711 S.W.2d 208 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
55. Id. at 209-10.
56. 515 S.W.2d 600 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974).
57. Id. at 602-03.
58. 670 S.W.2d 552 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
59. Id. at 555; see also State v. Davison, 668 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Mo. Ct. App.
1984) (independent evidence that the car had left the road; evidence sufficiently
corroborated statement that driver had a blowout to be admissible).
60. 481 S.W.2d 615 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972); see also State v. Friesen, 725 S.W.2d
638 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). In Friesen, defendant and friend were standing next to
defendant's truck which was stuck in a ditch. A passing highway patrol officer stopped
and later testified that defendant had stated "I overshot the driveway." Id. at 639.
It was held that the corpus delicti had not been established and the conviction was
reversed. The court stated, "The record before us establishes that Defendant was
intoxicated but does not show either by direct or circumstantial evidence, that he or
anyone else operated the truck while under the influence." Id. at 640.
1987]
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to admit the defendant's extrajudicial statements.6' The court explained that
"[i]ndependent of his admissions to the officer, there was no evidence from
any source that prior to the time [the officer] observed appellant walking
around on the sidewalk he was operating his motor vehicle. This is an es-
sential element of the offense charged ... "62
2. The Dodson Rule-Proof of Subsequent Intoxication.
A crucial element of the State's case in an intoxication-related prose-
cution is establishing not only that the defendant was intoxicated when ar-
rested, but that he operated a motor vehicle while in this condition.63 If there
is an unaccounted for interval between the time that the defendant was
driving and the time of arrest, this requirement may become an issue. The
State may be called upon to refute the possibility that the defendant became
intoxicated or consumed alcohol after he ceased driving.
State v. Dodson,6 is perhaps the leading Missouri case holding that
evidence of intoxication at a time subsequent to driving does not sustain the
State's burden of proof. In Dodson, the defendant's car ran off the road at
approximately 8:55 p.m.. Another person stopped to help and drove the
defendant home. This witness later testified that the defendant did not appear
to be intoxicated. At approximately 9:40 p.m., a highway patrol officer went
to the defendant's home, found him in an intoxicated condition, and arrested
him for DWI. The defendant testified at trial that after the accident he took
"three big drinks of whiskey before lying down." 65 The court found that
"[t]he fact that defendant was intoxicated at 9:40 p.m. is not substantial
proof as to his condition approximately one hour previously." 6
In subsequent cases, a number of factors have been considered by the
courts in determining whether Dodson is applicable. These factors include:
61. Verstraete, 481 S.W.2d at 617.
62. Id. The court reasoned that "[t]he circumstantial evidence that appellant's
car was parked ... against the curb 50 to 75 feet from where the officer first saw
appellant does not support an inference that he was driving it prior to that time."
Id.
63. See State v. Dodson, 496 S.W.2d 272, 273 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
64. 496 S.W.2d 272 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
65. Id. at 273. The police testified that the defendant initially told them that
he had not been driving that night. At trial, he denied making such a statement. The
court held that the State could not rely on the alleged extrajudicial statements. The
court noted that the statements were not admissions, and pointed out that even if
the jury disbelieved the defendant's testimony, such "disbelief does not permit an
affirmative inference that all drinking which resulted in defendant's intoxication oc-
curred prior to the accident." Id. at 275 (citing State v. Taylor, 422 S.W.2d 633, 638
(Mo. 1968)) (disbelief of testimony given by a defendant cannot be probative in favor
of the State).
66. Dodson, 496 S.W.2d at 273.
[Vol. 52
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1) whether the defendant was in or near the car at the time of arrest; 2) the
amount of time elapsed from when the defendant was driving to the time of
arrest; 3) whether the defendant was observed driving 6r immediately there-
after, and his condition at that time; 4) whether the defendant had access
to intoxicants in the interval between driving and the arrest; and 5) whether
the defendant admitted he was driving. 67
The Dodson rule is likely to become an issue in cases arising under the
recently enacted statute permitting warrantless arrests for DWI suspects. 63 As
a general rule, a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor can ory be made if
the violation occurs in the presence of the arresting officer. 69 However, the
67. For subsequent cases following Dodson, see State v. Liebhart, 707 S.W.2d
427, 429 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (no evidence as to the interval between the accident
and the officer's arrival at the scene, and no evidence of the absence of intoxicants
at the scene to refute the possibility of intoxication during the interval); State v.
Kennedy, 530 S.W.2d 479, 481 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (defendant outside car, unknown
interval between driving and arrest, and no evidence that defendant ever drove the
vehicle). It might be noted that in Liebhart, the court appears to suggest that the
State is required to present at least some evidence refuting the possibility of intoxi-
cation during the interval between driving and arrest. But cf. State v. Johnston, 670
S.W.2d 552, 557 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984), where the court rejected the argument that
the State should be required to present evidence precluding the possibility of subse-
quent intoxication.
For subsequent cases distinguishing Dodson, see State v. Wolf, 727 S.W.2d
477 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (50 minute interval between driving and arrest, and defen-
dant had access to intoxicants; however, witness who arrived immediately after single
car accident testified that defendant appeared intoxicated at the scene); Kiso v. King,
691 S.W.2d 374 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (short interval between driving and arrest; no
evidence of intoxicants at the scene, admitted driving); Johnston, 670 S.W.2d 552
(Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (defendant found in his car; 28 minute interval between driving
and arrest; no evidence of intoxicants at the scene; admitted driving); City of Excelsior
Springs v. Thurston, 618 S.W.2d 49 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (seen driving erratically;
short interval between driving and arrest; no intoxicants in the car); State v. English,
575 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (approximately one hour between arrest and
driving; observed drinking in interval; however, witnesses testified that defendant was
driving erratically and was intoxicated at the accident scene); State v. Hamaker, 524
S.W.2d 176 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (witnesses testified defendant was intoxicated im-
mediately after the accident); State v. Bruns, 522 S.W.2d 54 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975)
(defendant in his car parked in driveway; attempting to start motor; 25 minute interval
between time observed driving and his arrest); State v. Milligan, 516 S.W.2d 795
(Mo. Ct. App. 1974) (prior to accident observed driving erratically; 20 minute interval
between driving and arrest; no credible access to intoxicants).
68. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 577.039 (1986); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S.
740 (1984) (discussion of fourth amendment principles and warrantless arrests for
noncriminal traffic offenses).
69. W. LAFAv &A. ScoTT, HADBooK ON CRunAL LAW § 56(1972) ("[The
prevailing view is that an officer may arrest under authority of an arrest warrant,
without a warrant on reasonable grounds to believe that a felony has been committed
by the person arrested, or without a warrant for any offense committed in his pres-
ence."). The authors noted, however, that the requirement of a warrant for out-of-
presence misdemeanors has been changed by statute in some jurisdictions.
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Missouri legislature has made an exception to this rule in section 577.039,70
which permits police officers to arrest a person without a warrant if they
have reasonable grounds to believe that the person has violated either the
DWI or BAC laws. This authority exists whether or not the violation occurred
in the officer's presence, so long as the arrest occurs within an hour and a
half of the claimed violation.7' The application of this statute, however, will
be tempered by the Dodson rule. The State will still be required to present
substantial proof that the defendant was intoxicated at the time he was
operating a motor vehicle.72
3. Challenges to the Issue of Intoxication.
To convict a person of DWI, the State must present substantial evidence
that the person was in fact in an "intoxicated condition." The statutory
definition does not require any proof of an "impaired state," and merely
provides that a "person is in an 'intoxicated condition' when he is under the
influence of alcohol, a controlled substance, or drug or any combination
thereof."'73 To establish that an accused was intoxicated, the State may pres-
ent the testimony of witnesses regarding the defendant's behavior or con-
dition, or the results of any chemical test showing blood-alcohol content. 74
As previously noted, chemical analysis is not required to prove that the
defendant was intoxicated.75
70. Mo. REV. STAT. § 577.039 (1986).
71. Id.; see also Collette v. Director of Revenue, 717 S.W.2d 551 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1986). In Collette, the court urged the legislature to reconsider the hour and a
half time limit. The court stated that "[t]he statute places an investigating officer in
an almost impossible position in the attempt to comply with § 577.039 which is
prerequisite to the application of § 577.041 [revocation for refusal of chemical anal-
ysis]." Id. at 558. It would seem, however, that 90 minutes is hardly an "impossible"
time limit for warrantless arrests of DWI suspects. In Collette, for example, the
officer had a sufficient opportunity to arrest the appellant within the time allowed,
but merely failed to do so. Because there was no valid arrest, the implied consent
law was not triggered. For further discussion of Collette, see infra notes 129, 233.
For further discussion of license revocation for refusal of chemical testing, see infra
notes 224-62 and accompanying text. In Strode v. McNeil, 724 S.W.2d 245 (Mo.
1987) (en banc), the court held that the hour and a half time limit of § 577.039 does
not apply to violations of county or municipal ordinances.
72. See, e.g., State v. Dodson, 496 S.W.2d 272, 273 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
73. Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.001(2) (1986). It has been repeatedly held that juries
do not need to be instructed on the definition of "intoxicated" because it is a "well-
defined and well understood" term. See State v. Johnson, 625 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1981). It would seem, however, that the term "intoxicated" is subject to
a number of different meanings as to the degree required to make the condition a
criminal offense.
74. E.g., State v. Watts, 601 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Mo. 1980).
75. E.g., Watts, 601 S.W.2d 617; State v. Ruark, 720 S.W.2d 453 (Mo. Ct.
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A witness need not be qualified as an "expert" in the area to testify as
to his opinion whether the defendant was intoxicated. The general rule is
that "[]ay witnesses may give an opinion on the intoxication of another if
preceded by evidence of conduct and appearance observed by them to support
the opinion."' 76 In addition, the witness must have "had a reasonable op-
portunity to observe the alleged offender. '"77 When the witness is a police
officer, the courts often note the number of years they have been so em-
ployed.78 However, there does not appear to be any substantial requirement
that the witness have any background or experience in recognizing an "in-
toxicated condition." For example, in State v. English,79 the court determined
that a fourteen year old passenger in a car hit by the defendant, who "had
observed people on a few occasions of intoxication," was qualified to give
his opinion that the defendant was intoxicated. 0
In addition to the testimony of witnesses, the trial court has discretion
to admit videotaped evidence of the defendant's behavior while in the book-
ing room.81 The tape would be made at or around the time of the breathalyzer
test and thus would accurately show the defendant's conduct at the time that
his blood alcohol level was tested. The foundational requirements for ad-
mission are satisfied if the officer testifies that the tape or copy is "an
accurate 'and complete depiction of the events occurring."'82 It would seem
that the use of such evidence should be strongly encouraged. In intoxication
cases, where the sufficiency of evidence often becomes a "swearing contest"
between the accused and the police officer, an objective version of the ac-
cused's conduct would be highly instructive to the finder of fact.
At trial, the defendant may want to testify on his own behalf. He has
a right to give his opinion as to whether he was intoxicated at the relevant
App. 1986); State v. Valerius, 672 S.W.2d 726 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Craw-
ford, 646 S.W.2d 841 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Walker, 588 S.W.2d 726 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1979); see also infra notes 104-08 and accompanying text (discussion of
whether State is required to submit test results into evidence if the test was performed).
76. State v. English, 575 S.W.2d 761, 763 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) ("The basis
for admission of such an opinion should be such as to render the witness able to
arrive at an intelligent opinion with respect to the subject matter." Id. (citing 32
C.J.S. Evidence § 546(4) (1964))); see also Crawford, 646 S.W.2d at 842-43.
77. Walker, 588 S.W.2d at 727.
78. E.g., State v. Palmer, 606 S.W.2d 207, 208 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (15 years
experience); State v. Milligan, 516 S.W.2d 795, 798 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974) (7 years
experience); State v. Persell, 468 S.W.2d 719, 720 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971) (18 years
experience).
79. 575 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
80. Id. at 763.
81. Rogers v. King, 684 S.W.2d 390, 392 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
82. Id.; see also State v. Molasky, 655 S.W.2d 663, 668 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
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time, and to present evidence of "the safe and careful operation of his motor
vehicle .. ."I3 The denial of this right has been held to be reversible error.
The defendant may, of course, also call other witnesses to testify in his
defense.A5 A defendant's testimony regarding problems with and treatment
of alcoholism, and testimony by his physician concerning such treatment has
been held to be irrelevant to any issue in intoxication-related driving of-
fenses. 6
b. Evidence of Refusal to Submit to Chemical Testing.
There is a split of authority among the states as to whether evidence of
a defendant's refusal to submit to chemical analysis of his blood-alcohol level
is admissible at his criminal trial.87 Missouri has traditionally held that such
evidence is not admissible. 8 However, the Missouri legislature recently revised
section 577.041 to provide that evidence of refusal of chemical testing is
admissible at a person's trial for DWI or a BAC. 9
83. State v. Persell, 468 S.W.2d 719, 721 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971). The court
reasoned that "the manner of the defendant's driving of his motor vehicle, whether
carefully or carelessly, is relevant to the issue of whether he was intoxicated." Id.
(citing State v. Ryan, 275 S.W.2d 350 (Mo. 1955)); see also State v. Ellsworth, 468
S.W.2d 722, 723 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971).
84. See Persell, 468 S.W.2d at 721; Ellsworth, 468 S.W.2d at 723.
85. In State v. Kimmel, 720 S.W.2d 790 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986), the court held
that the trial court's exclusion of the testimony of defendant's witness, who was a
passenger in defendant's car at the time of arrest was "fundamentally unfair." The
State did not show any prejudice which would result from the testimony.
86. State v. Hampton, 607 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). The trial court
held that such evidence was pertinent only to the issue of punishment and excluded
the testimony. The appellate court agreed with the exclusion, but held that "biblio-
graphical information about the accused calculated to procure the jury's beneficence
... is irrelevant ... on any issue of the case, including punishment." Id. at 226
(citing State v. Clemmons, 460 S.W.2d 541, 545 (Mo. 1970)).
87. See Annotation, Admissibility in Criminal Case of Evidence that Accused
Refused to Submit to Scientific Test to Determine Amount of Alcohol in System, 87
A.L.R.2D 370 (1963).
88. See, e.g., City of St. Joseph v. Johnson, 539 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. Ct. App.
1976). The court discussed at length the rationale for excluding "refusal evidence."
The court first pointed out that Missouri "allows a motorist . . . 'the present, real
option either to consent to the test or refuse it'. . . " Id. at 786 (citation omitted).
It was noted that Missouri accords arrested persons the right to consult with counsel
prior to deciding whether to consent; such a right would not exist unless the suspect
had a legal right to refuse. The St. Joseph court reasoned that "on principles of
fundamental fairness ... a defendant accorded a right by statute should not be
required to explain the exercise of that right nor should it be used to create an
inference of guilt." Id. at 787. At the time of the St. Joseph decision, the only
statutory penalty for refusing chemical analysis was the possibility of license revo-
cation.
89. Mo. Rv. STAT. § 577.041(1) (1986). The revised statute requires that
police officers warn persons of the possible use of evidence of their refusal. Id.
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The United States Supreme Court has addressed the constitutionality of
statutes which permit the State to introduce evidence of refusal of chemical
testing. In South Dakota v. Neville,90 the Court held that the admission of
such evidence in a defendant's criminal trial does not violate the privilege
against self-incrimination. The Court initially pointed out that there is no
constitutional right to refuse a lawful request to submit to chemical testing 2 ;
any such right a person may have is a matter of the state's legislative "grace."
If the state chooses to give suspects a right to refuse testing, the statutory
penalties of license revocation and the use of such evidence at trial is per-
missible. 92 The Court went on to explain that "the Fifth Amendment is
limited to prohibiting the use of 'physical or moral compulsion' exerted on
the person asserting the privilege." 93 The Court held that "a refusal to take
a blood-alcohol test.., is not an act coerced by the officer, and thus is not
protected by the privilege against self-incrimination. "
94
The Neville Court also upheld the use of refusal evidence against a due
process challenge. Although the police officers had not warned the suspect
that the evidence could be used against him at trial, the Court held that there
was no "implicit promise to forego use of the evidence that would unfairly
'trick' respondent.'' 95
c. Sufficiency of Evidence.
Challenges to the sufficiency of opinion evidence regarding intoxication
are generally unsuccessful, so long as the witness had a reasonable oppor-
tunity to observe the accused and testifies to conduct which supports the
opinion.96 The observed "symptoms" commonly recited by the courts as
sufficient evidence include: bloodshot and/or watery eyes, flushed face, in-
coherent or slurred speech, "mussed" clothing, unsteady, stumbling, or stag-
gering gait, an odor of alcohol on the person's breath, and poor results on
90. 459 U.S. 553 (1983).
91. Id. at 559-60 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 562 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397 (1976)).
94. Id. at 564. The Court noted that some courts have determined that refusal
evidence is admissible under the fifth amendment on the grounds that it is a "physical
act rather than a communication," or alternatively because it is "similar to other
circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt." Id. at 560-61 (citations omitted).
The Neville court declined to rest its decision on these grounds.
95. Id. at 566. As noted, under the revised Mo. Ruv. STAT. § 577.041(1)
(1986), officers must warn suspects that evidence of their refusal of chemical testing
may be used against them.
96. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
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the field sobriety tests.9 The driving offenses which commonly seem to in-
itiate the police contact include speeding, weaving, and involvement in an
accident.98 Of course, a defendant need not have exhibited all of these "symp-
toms," and convictions are based on any number of behavioral combinations.
In a DWI prosecution, the State is not required to present evidence of
the defendant's blood-alcohol level. However, if such evidence is available,
and if it indicates a blood alcohol level of .10 percent or higher, there is a
statutory presumption that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the
test.9 9 This obviously makes the State's case much easier to prove. If the
chemical analysis indicates that the person's blood alcohol level was less than
.10 percent, the statute provides that the charges "shall be dismissed with
prejudice," unless the court determines that the case comes within one of
three statutory exceptions.'00 A dismissal is unwarranted if:
I) [t]here is evidence that the chemical analysis is reliable ... due to the
lapes of time between the alleged violation and the obtaining of the
specimen;
2) [t]here is evidence that the defendant was under the influence of a con-
trolled substance, or drug, or a combination of either or both with or
without alcohol; or
97. See, e.g., State v. O'Toole, 673 S.W.2d 25 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) (stag-
gered, couldn't recite alphabet, odor of alcohol); State v. Powers, 690 S.W.2d 859
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (bloodshot eyes, flushed face, stumbling gait, odor of alcohol);
State v. Jackson, 643 S.W.2d 74 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (bloodshot eyes, flushed face,
unsteady walk, slurred speech, mussed clothes, odor of alcohol). But see State v.
Valerius, 672 S.W.2d 726 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). In Valerius, the defendant was seen
weaving and skidded off the road. The police report indicated that defendant was
confused, incoherent, stumbling, had the odor of alcohol and had a poor performance
on the field sobriety tests. The breathayzer test showed less than .01%. It was held
that the evidence failed to rebut the statutory presumption of Mo. REv. STAT. §
577.037(1) (Supp. 1982) [since revised], that a person is presumed not to be intoxicated
if the test results are lower than .05%. The court was apparently influenced by the
fact that the police officer "never expressed an opinion on whether defendant was
intoxicated." Valerius, 672 S.W.2d at 728; see infra note 103.
Field sobriety tests consist of various "exercises" which a police officer may
ask a person to perform, such as reciting the alphabet, counting to ten or counting
backwards, counting money, walking a straight line, balancing on one leg and touch-
ing the index finger to the tip of the nose with eyes closed. The implied consent
statute, section 577.020, makes no reference to cooperation with such requests, and
it would appear that a suspect is under no legal obligation to comply with the officer's
"request."
98. See, e.g., Powers, 690 S.W.2d 859 (weaving); State v. Schupp, 677 S.W.2d
909 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (accident); State v. Armistead, 655 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1983) (speeding).
99. Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.037(1) (1986) provides: "If there was ten-hun-
dredths of one percent or more by weight of alcohol in the person's blood, this shall
be prima facie evidence that the person was intoxicated at the time the specimen was
taken."
100. Id. § 577.037(5).
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3) [t]here is substantial evidence of intoxication from physical observations
of witnesses or admissions of the defendant.
10
'
The statute thus makes it clear that a suspect cannot "pass" a blood alcohol
test. Although the State is permitted to rely upon the validity of test results
exceeding .10 percent (leading to a presumption of intoxication),'1 2 the de-
fendant cannot prove that he is not intoxicated by testing below. 10 percent. 03
In such a case, the State can instead rely upon the subjective opinion of
witnesses, which presumably initiated the arrest and chemical test in the first
place.
If a defendant has submitted to chemical testing of his blood alcohol
level, it appears that the State is not required to produce the results into
evidence. Early case law, however, at least penalized such action by the State.
For example, in State v. Persell,'04 the State failed to produce the results of
a breathalyzer test which had been administered to the defendant following
his arrest. The court wrote that "where one of the parties falls to produce
evidence which is available to him and which he might be expected to pro-
duce, his failure to produce it authorizes a strong presumption that such
evidence, if produced, would be adverse to him."10 The continuing validity
of this presumption, however, may be questionable in light of more recent
case law.
In State v. Crawford,'06 the record indicated that a breathalyzer test had
been administered to the defendant, but the results were not admitted at
trial. The court noted that the record was "silent as to the reason."'3 7 The
Crawford court made no reference to the Persell presumption, nor any neg-
ative inference, simply writing that "Missouri courts have never required the
State to produce the results of chemical tests as a prerequisite to proof of
intoxication." 08
101. Id.
102. Id. § 577.037(1).
103. This is because the State can look behind otherwise valid chemical test
results and rely upon the opinion testimony of witnesses.
Prior to the 1983 amendment, Missouri law outlined three presumptions based
upon blood alcohol levels: (1) if the person tested .0570 or below, it was presumed
that he was not intoxicated; (2) if the person tested above .05 %, but lower that .10070,
the test did not give rise to any presumption, but it could be considered with other
competent evidence; (3) if the person tested .10% or higher, the test was prima facie
evidence of intoxication. Mo. Rv. STAT. § 577.037 (1978).
104. 468 S.W.2d 719 (1971).
105. Id. at 721; see also State v. Ellsworth, 468 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1971).
106. 646 S.W.2d 841 (1982).
107. Id. at 842 n.2.
108. Id. The Crawford court relied upon two earlier cases in reaching its con-
clusion. The two cases, however, addressed significantly different factual situations.
In State v. Walker, 588 S.W.2d 726 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979), no chemical test had been
administered to the defendant; in State v. Farmer, 548 S.W.2d 202 (Mo. Ct. App.
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C. Breathalyzers and Chemical Tests.
Proper chemical analysis results are a crucial element of the State's case
with a BAC prosecution. 1°9 The issues herein are also relevant to DWI charges
because the prima facie evidence rule will apply if the test indicates a blood
alcohol level of .10 percent or higher. 10 However, with a DWI prosecution,
even if the defendant successfully challenges the chemical analysis results,
the State may still rely upon testimonial evidence of his conduct.", In ad-
dition, chemical analysis issues may arise in connection with administrative
proceedings and license revocations." 2
1. Implied Consent Law.
Missouri statute section 577.020 provides that a person who drives "upon
the public highways of this state shall be deemed to have given consent to
... a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, saliva or urine for the
purpose of determining the alcohol or drug content of his blood ... ,,1
The statute conditions this "consent" upon an arrest for "any offense arising
out of acts which the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe
were committed while the person was driving . . . while in an intoxicated or
drugged condition.""114 In other words, for consent to be "implied," there
must have been an arrest and probable cause to believe that the person was
driving in an intoxicated condition.'
Implied consent laws have been justified on the basis that driving is a
privilege rather than a right. 16 The courts have reasoned that in exchange
1977), the test was apparently inaccurate. The courts therein simply held that the
State was not required to perform or rely solely upon blood alcohol tests to prove
an accused was intoxicated. The Walker and Farmer courts did not hold that the
State can withhold evidence. See California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 480 (1984)
("The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the State to disclose
to criminal defendants favorable evidence that is material either to guilt or to pun-
ishment.").
109. Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.012(1) (1986) requires that chemical analysis of the
defendant's blood show .10% or higher concentration of alcohol.
110. Id. § 577.037(1).
11I. See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
112. See infra notes 263-95 and 296-328 and accompanying text.
113. Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.020(1) (1986).
114. Id.
115. State v. Copeland, 680 S.W.2d 327, 331 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). Probable
cause to arrest a person for DWI "exists where a police officer observes a traffic
violation or the unusual operation of a vehicle and upon stopping the motorist,
indications of alcohol consumption are noted." Cissell v. Director of Revenue, 737
S.W.2d 522, 523 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (citing Schranz v. Director of Revenue, 708
S.W.2d 912, 913 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)).
116. Gooch v. Spradling, 523 S.W.2d 861, 865 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
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for their driver's licenses, motorists impliedly consent to a blood test in the
event they are suspected of DWI.
1 7
Several courts have referred to the term "implied consent law" as a
"convenient misnomer." 18 This is because motorists are granted by statute
"the present real option either to consent to thetest or refuse it."119 A police
officer who has the requisite "reasonable grounds" to suspect a person of
DWI may request that the person submit to a chemical test (or tests) of his
blood.120 The statute requires such a "request" to include the reasons for
wanting the test, and it must also inform the person that refusal may result
in revocation of his license and may be used as evidence against him at
trial.12 1 Further, the statute expressly provides that if the motorist refuses the
test, "then none shall be given." 12 The motorist, therefore, is not bound by
his implied consent and cannot be forced to submit to testing.In
Assuming that probable cause exists, a police officer may lawfully re-
quest a suspect to submit to any two of the authorized tests.' 24 A refusal of
117. Id.; see also State v. Ikerman, 698 S.W.2d 902, 906 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
But see City of St. Joseph v. Johnson, 539 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976)
(rejecting this theory). Perhaps a statement to this effect should be included on the
backs of driver's licenses so that motorists could know what they have "impliedly
consented to."
118. Gooch, 523 S.W.2d at 865; see also St. Joseph, 539 S.W.2d at 786
(" 'implied consent law' both misnames [the statute] and also misleads as to its legal
effect").
119. St. Joseph, 539 S.W.2d at 786; Gooch, 523 S.W.2d at 865; see also
Ikerman, 698 S.W.2d at .906.
120. Mo. RPv. STAT. § 577.020(1) (1986).
121. Id. § 577.041(1). For a discussion of license revocation for refusal of
chemical testing, see infra notes 223-61 and accompanying text.
If the officer informs the suspect that the purpose of the test is to determine
blood alcohol content, the "reasons for wanting the test" requirement is satisfied.
Comm v. McNeill, 716 S.W.2d 915, 917 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). The officer is not
required to detail all of the facts and circumstances which gave rise to the suspicion
that the person was driving while intoxicated. In re Green, 511 S.W.2d 129, 133-34
(Mo. Ct. App. 1974).
122. Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.041(1) (1986)
123. E.g., State v. Ikerman, 698 S.W.2d 902, 906 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) ("blood
sample may be taken without a warrant ... where the defendant is under arrest and
has not negated his implied consent under § 577.020 by invoking his right of refusal
under § 577.041"); see also City of St. Joseph v. Johnson, 539 S.W.2d 784, 786
(Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Gooch v. Spradling, 523 S.W.2d 861, 865 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
But see State v. Setter, 721 S.W.2d 11, 16 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986), where the court
indicated a suspect can be forced to submit to having a blood sample taken. It is
unclear if the court intended to limit its holding to persons charged with involuntary
manslaughter; however, this language is directly contrary to the express statutory
right to refuse chemical testing under Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.041(1) (1986). In addition,
the language is contrary to Ikerman, on which the Setter court purported to rely.
124. Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.020(2) (1986). The statute authorizes chemical anal-
ysis of a suspect's breath, blood, saliva or urine. Id. § 577.020(1).
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either one may result in revocation of the person's driver's license.'2 In
addition, the accused does not have a right to choose which of the statutory
tests he will consent to.'7
If a person is incapable of expressly refusing the test, for example be-
cause of unconsciousness or death, his "consent" to testing is deemed not
to have been withdrawn. 27 Police officers have the authority to direct medical
personnel to withdraw blood for alcohol analysis, and these directions must
be complied with unless the procedure would endanger the person's health. 2 1
However, it should be remembered that the person must have been arrested
and there must have been reasonable grounds to believe that the person was
driving in an intoxicated condition before his "consent" will be implied. 129
2. Validity and Admissibility of Breathalyzer Results.
The Missouri legislature has determined that chemical analysis test results
are "valid" if the test was "performed according to methods approved by
the state division of health by licensed medical personnel or by a person
possessing a valid permit ... ."130 The rules regarding the approved equip-
125. Id. §§ 577.020(1), .020(2), .041(1); see also infra note 126.
126. Kiso v. King, 691 S.W.2d 374 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). The court reasoned
that:
If [such] a choice were allowed, a person could avoid taking a test by
demanding one which he knew to be unavailable. The arrested person is
protected from arbitrary action by the officer because the statute limits the
number of tests which the officer can request to two.
Id. at 377.
127. Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.033 (1986).
128. Id. § 577.029. For a discussion of physician-patient privilege, see infra
notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
129. Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.020(1) (1986); State v. Copeland, 680 S.W.2d 327,
330-31 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). The court in Collette v. Director of Revenue, 717 S.W.2d
551, 558 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986), expressed frustration with the arrest requirement of
the implied consent law. The court stated that "a driver might be in such poor physical
condition that understanding of an arrest might not be possible." The validity of the
arrest, however, does not rest on the accused's subjective understanding of being
arrested. See discussion in State v. Ikerman, 698 S.W.2d 902, 905-06 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985).
130. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 577.020(3), .026(1), .037(4) (1986). In the recent case
of State v. Peters, 729 S.W.2d 243 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987), the results of a blood test
were held to be inadmissible because the Department of Health had "failed to issue
any regulations approving techniques, devices, equipment or methods for determining
blood alcohol content from blood samples ... ." Id. at 243. See 19 C.S.R. 20-
30.070; State v. Kummer, 741 S.W.2d 285 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (test results from
blood samples are admissible if the method was approved at the time the results are
offered into evidence).
Recently, the courts have not been overly strict about the permit requirement.
See Elkins v. Director of Revenue, 728 S.W.2d 567 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987), where the
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ment and operating methods and the standards of competence for the persons
administering the test have been set out in the Code of State Regulations.",
If there has been any significant deviation from the rules or procedures, it
is possible that the results could be held invalid.132
The foundational requirements for admission of breathalyzer results into
evidence are based upon the statutory requirements for validity. The person
administering the test must have been a qualified operator and must show
that the Division of Health procedures were followed.13 The courts are re-
quired to take judicial notice of the Division's rules, M and approved checkl-
ists may be admitted into evidence as a procedural matter to insure compliance
with the rules.135
A defendant's consent to chemical testing must have been voluntarily
given in order for the results to be admissible at trial. 3 6 In State v. Ikerman,
37
the defendant had initially told the police that he did not want to take the
test; after further discussion he eventually acquiesced. The court stated that
"[o]nce the voluntariness is challenged, the state carries the burden of proving
the voluntariness of the consent by a preponderance of the evidence."'M3 It
was held that the blood sample was taken in violation of section 577.041,
"only evidence of the officer's qualifications to operate such machine was the permit
which became effective some eight months after the administration of Elkins's [sic]
test." Id. at 568. The court nonetheless held that "[p]roduction of the permit itself
at trial is not necessary ... to prove one's qualifications in that possession of such
permit is a matter within one's personal knowledge and testimony of such fact is
adequate proof." Id.
131. Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 13, §§ 50-140.010-.060 (1984).
132. Although the courts consistently state that the division of health rules
must be strictly followed, research has not yet disclosed a single case in which the
court found a sufficient deviation to justify exclusion of the test results. In State v.
Jackson, 643 S.W.2d 74 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982), the defendant presented evidence from
the police report that the officer had not complied with the rule requiring 20 minutes
of observation prior to the test. The court accepted the officer's explanation that the
times had been incorrectly reported and admitted the evidence. Id. at 77-78.
133. E.g., Jannet v. King, 687 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); State
v. Johnson, 687 S.W.2d 706, 709-10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); City of Clinton v. Kam-
merich, 642 S.W.2d 353, 356-57 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
134. Mo. REv. STAT. § 536.031(5) (1986); Jannet, 687 S.W.2d at 254-55; John-
son, 687 S.W.2d at 709.
135. State v. Shephard, 639 S.W.2d 258, 260 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); State v.
Preston, 585 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
136. State v. Ikerman, 698 S.W.2d 902 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). However, the
suspect may still be deemed to have consented to chemical testing pursuant to Mo.
REv. STAT. § 577.033, if he fails to invoke his right to refuse under § 577.041. But
see State v. Setter, 721 S.W.2d 11, 16 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (discussed supra note
123).
137. 698 S.W.2d 902 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
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which provides that "[i]f a person under arrest refuses upon the request of
the arresting officer to submit to a chemical test, ... then none shall be
given."'13 9
Missouri statute section 577.020(6) provides that "[u]pon request of the
person who is tested, full information concerning the test shall be made
available to him.'1' Initially, this statute was held to give the person dis-
covery rights "to enable [him] to intelligently exercise his right to challenge
the test's accuracy."' 4' Failure by the State to comply with a proper discovery
request was held to bar the introduction of the test results into evidence. 142
In the recent case of State v. Clark, 43 however, it was held that the statute
does not provide a procedure for pre-trial discovery; the defendant must
instead comply with the requirements of Missouri Supreme Court Rule 25.'"
The Clark court determined that section 577.020(6) now requires "that the
officer administering the test ... respond to questions regarding the test
procedures." '45
A 1983 amendment to section 577.037 provides that the physician-patient
privilege' 46 will not prevent the introduction of otherwise admissible chemical
analysis evidence.' 4' Prior to this change, courts had held that defendants
139. Id. at 906-07.
140. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 577.020(6), ..029 (1986).
141. State v. Paul, 437 S.W.2d 98, 101 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969); see also State v.
Blake, 620 S.W.2d 359 (Mo. 1981) (en banc) (the court indicated that such discovery
is also important to allow a potential challenge to the qualifications of the person
giving the test).
142. Paul, 437 S.W.2d at 101-03.
143. 723 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
144. Id. at 19-20 (rejecting the Paul court's interpretation of Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 577.020(6) (1986)). Failure by the State to comply with a proper discovery request
under Mo. Sup. CT. R. 25 might still be sufficiently prejudicial to the defendant to
require exclusion of the evidence. In Blake, 620 S.W.2d at 360-61, the Missouri
Supreme Court held that the defendant was prejudiced by both the failure of the
State to comply with discovery requests and by the late endorsement of witnesses and
evidence. The court declined to decide whether disregarding "applicable discovery
rules alone would mandate reversal." Id. at 361; see also State v. Calvert, 682 S.W.2d
474 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) (if defendant obtains a trial de novo, or hearing in a
different court, an outstanding discovery request must be renewed).
145. Clark, 723 S.W.2d at 20 n.4. The court stated that such questions must
be answered "[i]n order that the consent or refusal of the person to be tested be
informed ..... " Id. It is doubtful, however, that the court intended this to constitute
an additional requirement for a valid consent or refusal of chemical testing.
146. Mo. REv. STAT. § 491.060(5) (1986) provides that physicians are incom-
petent to testify "concerning any information ... acquired from any patient while
attending him in a professional character, and which information was necessary to
enable him to prescribe ... or do any act for him. .. ."
147. Id. § 577.037(1). It has also been held that the physician-patient privilege
will not bar the introduction of statements made by a defendant to medical personnel
that he had been drinking. In State v. Schupp, 677 S.W.2d 909 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984),
22
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had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of their blood.148 If
blood had been withdrawn from a person for medical purposes, the test
results could not be used against such person in subsequent criminal pro-
ceedings. 49
There have not yet been any cases applying the new version of the
statute.150 However, it appears to be consistent with the intent behind another
recent enactment. As previously noted, section 577.033 provides that "con-
sent" to testing is deemed not to have been withdrawn if the person is
incapable of expressly refusing the test. 5' it may be presumed that in such
situations, the test would be performed by medical personnel. If the physi-
cian-patient privilege could be raised to bar the introduction of test results,
the "continuing consent" statute would not appear to be of much utility.
3. Malfunction of Breathalyzer Machines.
Breathalyzer machines are assumed to be functioning properly.1 2 Their
reliability is said to be the basis for the value of the breathalyzer results. 5"
The testing authority does not have a burden to affirmatively establish that
the machine is working properly, unless there is evidence "at least suggesting
malfunction."' 54 "Suggestions" of malfunction generally arise where a later
the court found the privilege to be inapplicable because the statements were made in
the presence of third parties, and because they were unrelated to the defendant's
treatment. It would seem, however, that the presence/absence of alcohol in a patient's
system would be at least potentially relevant to medical treatment. In addition, re-
quiring a person in an emergency room to find a "private area" in which to discuss
his condition seems slightly unrealistic.
Another recent enactment also pertains to the physician-patient relationship. Mo.
REv. STAT. § 577.041(8) (1986) provides that "[n]otwvithstanding any other provision
of law or rule of confidentiality to the contrary, any physician licensed under Chapter
334, RSMo, who treats a person who appears intoxicated for injuries sustained in a
motor vehicle accident, may immediately report same to a highway patrol officer or
local law enforcement agency."
148. State v. Copeland, 680 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
149. Id. (citing Gonzenbach v. Ruddy, 645 S.W.2d 27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982));
State ex rel. Mehle v. Harper, 643 S.W.2d 643 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
150. The Copeland court decided the case under the "old statute" because the
blood' sample had been taken prior to the effective date of the 1983 amendment. The
court declined to decide "[w]hether the expectation of privacy in blood or the results
of tests on it has now been changed. . . ." Copeland, 680 S.W.2d at 329.
151. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
152. State v. Powell, 618 S.W.2d 47, 49 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); State v. Bush,
595 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
153. Powell, 618 S.W.2d at 49; Bush, 595 S.W.2d at 389.
154. State v. Powers, 690 S.W.2d 859, 861 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); see also
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inspection of the machine reveals that it is not working correctly. 55 Such
evidence may shift the burden to the testing authority to show that the
problem did not exist at the time of the defendant's test.156 The State can
meet this burden by showing that the malfunction was of a type or nature
that would probably have been noticed by the person administering the test. 57
In addition, it has been held that if the malfunction would have affected the
results in favor of the suspect, the admission of the evidence is not preju-
dicial. 158
4. Preservation of Breathalyzer Ampoules.
As previously noted, a person who submits to chemical analysis of his
blood alcohol level has a statutory right to "full information concerning the
test."' 159 This right, however, does not include the right to inspect or re-test
the ampoule used in the breathalyzer test.
In State v. Preston, 60 it was held that due process does not require the
preservation of breathalyzer samples. Recognizing that suppression of evi-
dence favorable to an accused is a violation of due process, 16' the court
reasoned that preservation of the ampoule would have produced neither
exculpatory nor material evidence. 62 The Preston court was satisfied that
suspects' due process rights were sufficiently protected by their statutory right
to have an independent blood test taken. 63
One problem with the Preston court's reasoning is that police officers
are not required to inform arrestees of their right to seek independent testing.
In the absence of such notice, and given the atmosphere of their arrest, it
seems unlikely that most people would think of this method of protecting
155. See, e.g., State v. Adams, 689 S.W.2d 828 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (defect
discovered when machine checked 53 days later).
156. Jannett, 687 S.W.2d at 254; State v. Deimeke, 500 S.W.2d 257 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1973).
157. Adams, 689 S.W.2d at 830.
158. Powers, 690 S.W.2d at 861; City of Cape Girardeau v. Geiser, 598 S.W.2d
151, 152 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
159. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 577.020(6), .029 (1986).
160. 585 S.W.2d 569 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
161. Id. at 571 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 571-72 (referring to the predecessor of § 577.020(5)). Part of the
court's reluctance to require preservation of breathalyzer samples was based upon
one line of scientific opinion which indicates that re-testing of ampoules is not feasible
or reliable. Id. at 571 (in spite of expert witness testimony that measurable factors
such as glass thickness and volume in ampoules could affect the test results); State
v. Bush, 595 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (citing MOENSSENS & INBAU,
SCMNTIIc EVmIENCE IN Cmau AL CAsEs 93 (1978)).
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their due process rights. 164 Nonetheless, several years after the Preston de-
cision, the U.S. Supreme Court reached the same result in California v.
Trombetta.165
In State v. Bush,166 the court indicated that a person could request that
the breathalyzer sample be preserved, and that the police would then have
a duty to protect the ampoule. 67 It appears, however, that the Division of
Health rules which the court relied upon have been changed. 16 It is now
unlikely that such a request would give rise to any duty to preserve the test
ampoule.
D. Right to Counsel.
1. Prior to Testing.
The Missouri Supreme Court has held that there is no "constitutional
right to consult with counsel prior to deciding whether or not to submit to
a breathalyzer test."' 1 9 The courts have recognized, however, that a right to
consult with counsel is granted to arrestees by both state statute and the
Rules of the Missouri Supreme Court.170 Rule 37.89171 provides that a person
who has been arrested without a warrant and held in custody has a right to
consult with counsel "at all times." Similarly, Missouri staute section 544.170,
the "twenty hour rule," gives a right to consult with counsel to anyone
164. See California v. Trombetta, 104 S. Ct. 2528, 2535 n.ll (1984) ("To the
extent that this and other access to evidence cases turn on the underlying fairness of
governmental procedures, it would be anomalous to permit the State to justify its
actions by relying on procedural alternatives that were available, but unknown to the
defendant.").
165. 467 U.S. 479 (1984).
166. 595 S.W.2d 386 (1980).
167. Id. at 389. The court referred to Mo. CODE REs. tit. 13, § 50-140.040(3)(1),
which apparently required the officer "to identify, label and protect, if applicable,
any preserved sample." The court went on to state that "where it has already been
determined that the sample is to be retained, as upon request by the arrestee, it is
the duty of the law enforcement officer to serve as custodian of the prospective
evidence." Bush, 595 S.W.2d at 389.
168. The current version of the Code does not contain the section relied upon
by the Bush court. See supra note 167.
169. Spradling v. Deimeke, 528 S.W.2d 759 (Mo. 1975). The court reasoned
that "[n]either the request to take a breathalyzer test nor the administration of the
test involves interrogation of the arrested person. It simply calls for an affirmative
or negative response, neither of which is incriminating in any respect." Id. at 764;
see also Comment, Right to Counsel Prior to Submission to Breathalyzer Test -
The Impact of Missouri Supreme Court Rule 37.89, 42 Mo. L. REv. 168 (1977).
170. E.g., State v. Ikerman 698 S.W.2d 902, 902 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
171. Mo. Suip. CT. R. 37.89; see also Mo. Su'. CT. R. 21.14.
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arrested for any "breach of the peace or other criminal offense.' 1 72
Case law confirms that a suspect does have a right to consult with an
attorney prior to deciding whether to consent to chemical analysis of his
blood alcohol level.'" However, this right does not extend to having an
attorney present during the test, 174 unless the attorney is already at the test
location.' 75
2. Right to Have Counsel Appointed.
The sixth and fourteenth amendments prohibit an indigent defendant
from being sentenced to imprisonment unless he has been afforded the op-
portunity to have counsel appointed on his behalf. 76 It is important to note
that this right to counsel does not arise merely because imprisonment is an
authorized penalty.1 " Rather, counsel must be appointed for an indigent
defendant only if a term of imprisonment will be imposed if the defendant
is found guilty. 78
A certainty of imprisonment upon conviction could arise either because
the judge has determined before trial that it would be an appropriate sentence
172. Mo. Rv. STAT. § 544.170 (1986).
173. E.g., Spradling v. Deimeke, 528 S.W.2d 759, 764-65 (Mo. 1975) (per-
mitting a reasonable amount of time for the suspect to consult with an attorney or
other person will not "undermine the purpose of [the DWI laws], nor affect the
validity of the test results"); see also Ikerman, 698 S.W.2d at 907; In re Purvis, 591
S.W.2d 29, 30 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Dan v. Spradling, 534 S.W.2d 813 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1976); Gooch v. Spradling, 523 S.W.2d 861, 866 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
In Curry v. Goldberg, 614 S.W.2d 318 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981), it is difficult to
understand precisely what rights the accused was said to have. The court wrote that
"[n]otwithstanding Curry's right as an arrested person to consult with counsel, which
was honored by offering him the use of the telephone, he had no right to consult
with counsel before deciding whether or not to submit to the breathalyzer test. .. ."
Id. at 319 (citing Deimeke, 528 S.W.2d at 764). It seems likely that the latter part
of the quote meant merely that the defendant did not have a constitutional right to
counsel prior to making his decision. See supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
174. E.g., Deimeke, 528 S.W.2d at 763 (consent to testing may be conditioned
on attorney's presence).
175. See, e.g., Curry, 614 S.W.2d at 319 (indicating that it might be unrea-
sonable for an officer to refuse to defer testing if attorney is "due to arrive at the
test site within a reasonable time"); Deimeke, 528 S.W.2d at 763 (if lawyer arrives
before or during the test, suspect has a right to have attorney present).
176. Trimble v. State, 593 S.W.2d 542, 544-45 (Mo. 1980) (en banc) (citing
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 374 (1979)).
177. Id. at 544 (citing Scott, 440 U.S. at 374).
178. See Dearing v. State, 631 S.W.2d 328, 331 (Mo. 1982) (en banc). The
court wrote that "even if Dearing had clearly shown indigency, there was, in the trial
of that misdemeanor, no constitutional or legal requirement for appointment of
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for the crime, or because it is mandated by statute. 179 For example, section
577.023(3) requires that a court impose a term of imprisonment for both
"persistent" and "prior offenders." 180 Where imprisonment is a statutorily
required sentence for an offense, an indigent defendant must be giventhe
opportunity to have counsel appointed.
3. Effect of Uncounselled Convictions
The most common issue raised by an uncounselled conviction is whether
it may be used to increase a defendant's sentence in a subsequent DWI or
BAC prosecution. Section 577.02381 is the sentence enhancement statute for
intoxication-related offenders; its purpose has been said to be to deter and
"severely punish" repeat offenders. 18 2
In Trimble v. State,8 3 the Missouri Supreme Court held that an un-
counselled misdemeanor conviction is valid so long as no imprisonment was
imposed. The court then reasoned that a conviction which was valid in terms
of "its own penalty," could be used to enhance the punishment imposed in
subsequent prosecutions.'8 In Trimble, the uncounselled conviction was used
to enhance the offense charged to a third offense felony DWI.
Later the same year, the United States Supreme Court addressed the
issue of uncounselled convictions and enhancement statutes. Its decision ap-
pears to have invalidated the holding of Trimble. In Baldasar v. Illinois,85
the Court held that "it [is] plain that petitioner's prior uncounselled mis-
demeanor conviction could not be used collaterally to impose an increased
term of imprisonment upon a subsequent conviction."' 86 Uncounselled con-
victions were not declared invalid, nor were misdemeanor defendants granted
a general right to counsel. Baldasar merely prevents such convictions from
179. See infra notes 180, 206-20 and accompanying text.
180. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 577.023 (1986) is the sentence enhancement statute for
intoxication-related traffic offenders. For further discussion of the enhancement stat-
ute and definitions of prior and peristent offenders, see infra notes 206-20 and ac-
companying text.
181. Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.023 (1986).
182. A.B. v. Frank, 657 S.W.2d 625, 628 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
183. 593 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. 1980) (en banc) (relying on Scott v. Illinois, 440
U.S. 367 (1979), and Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972)).
184. Trimble, 593 S.W.2d at 545. It should be noted that Trimble was decided
before the enactment of § 577.023 (the sentence enhancement statute). The petitioner's
convictions were under Mo. REv. STAT. § 564.440 (1978), which provided that "[any
person who violates the [statute] ... shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor on
conviction for the first two violations thereof, and a felony on conviction for the
third or subsequent violation. ..
185. 446 U.S. 222 (1980).
186. Id. at 226 (Marshall, J., concurring); see also State v. Wilson, 684 S.W.2d
544, 545 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (citing Baldasar, 446 U.S. 222).
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being "counted" for purposes of sentence enhancement in a later prosecution
if imprisonment would be imposed upon conviction.18 7 In State v. Wilson,'88
the Southern District held that "the principles of Baldasar ... are applicable
to driving offenses as defined in [the sentence enhancement statute]." 18 9
It should be noted that the 1982 version of the sentence enhancement
statute has been changed. Section 577.023 used to make a distinction between
counselled and uncounselled municipal/county violations.' 9o Under the prior
version, if the defendant had been represented by an attorney in the earlier
proceeding, the conviction could be used in a later alcohol-related prosecution
to enhance the punishment. 9' If the defendant had not been represented, a
plea or finding of guilty did not constitute a conviction for purposes of later
sentence enhancement. 9 2 The statute was changed in 1983, eliminating the
counselled versus uncounselled distinction. 93 In A.B. v. Frank,194 the Mis-
souri Supreme Court interpreted the new statute to mean that convictions
under municipal or county ordinances are not to be considered at all under
the sentence enhancement statute. 9 5
187. The term "uncounselled conviction" as used here refers to situations
where the defendant neither had nor waived counsel. If the record is silent, repre-
sentation or waiver cannot be presumed. State v. Wilson, 684 S.W.2d 544, 546-47
(Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (citing Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967)). However, a court
may properly look to "[c]opies from the record of proceedings of any court of record
of this state," pursuant to Mo. REv. STAT. § 490.130 (1986).
Mo. REv. STAT. § 600.051(1) outlines the admonitions required for a valid waiver
of counsel. See Mo. S. CT. R. 31.02. In Counts v. State, 725 S.W.2d 891 (Mo. Ct.
Api. 1987), the following docket sheet entry was determined to be sufficient to show
that defendant had waived counsel: "The court informs the defendant of the charges
filed against him and of his right to consult with friends or counsel concerning same.
The defendant declines further time or trial and enters a plea of guilty as charged."
Id. at 892.
188. 684 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
189. Id. at 546.
190. Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.023 (Supp. 1982).
191. Id. § 577.023(2). It might be noted that the conviction could be used to
enhance a later sentence regardless of the disposition of the case.
192. Id.
193. Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.023(13) (1986). In A.B. v. Frank, 657 S.W.2d 625(Mo. 1983) (en banc), the court recognized the potential chilling effect on a defen-
dant's right to counsel because "a conviction following a counselled defense [would]
be treated more prejudicially than would an uncounselled defense in a subsequent
drunk driving proceeding." Id. at 627.
194. 657 S.W.2d 625 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
195. Id. at 628-29. The court pointed out that the enhancement statute appears
to focus on state law violations. In addition, the court noted what appeared to be
an internal inconsistency in the statute. Section 577.023(13) provides that municipal
and county violations are to be treated as prior convictions, but that they may not
be used "to enhance a term of imprisonment in any subsequent proceeding." The
Frank court determined that such convictions were not to be considered in determining
"prior" or "persistent offender" status because the enhancement statute "provides
[Vol. 52
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A first offense DWI is a class B misdemeanor. 196 It is punishable by a
fine of up to $500197 and/or imprisonment for a term not to exceed six
months. 98 If the court determines that a suspended imposition of sentence
[SIS] would be appropriate, the person must be placed on supervised pro-
bation for a minimum of 2 years. 199 A first BAC offense is a class C mis-
demeanor.200 Upon conviction, a person may be fined up to $300201 and/or
imprisoned for not more than 15 days.2°2 The court also has the authority
to order a person convicted of either a DWI or BAC to complete an alcohol
or drug related traffic offender program [ARTOP]. 203 Participation in such
a program may be a condition for suspending part of the sentence, or it may
be ordered in addition to the other authorized penalties.? The costs of the
program must be paid by the person ordered to participate. 25
2. Second or Subsequent Offenses
The Missouri Legislature has acted to increase the severity of the sanc-
tions imposed upon repeat offenders. The sentence enhancement statute, 206
enacted in 1982, evidences a strong policy favoring a term of imprisonment
for prior and persistent offenders. 207
only for imprisonment, not for a fine." Frank, 657 S.W.2d at 628; see also 83 Op.
Att'y Gen. No. 132 (September 6, 1983).
An alternative interpretation would seem to be possible. In addition to the
imprisonment provisions, the sentence enhancement statute also increases the "class"
of the offense. Because of this, the authorized range of fines for repeat offenders is
also increased. Municipal and county violations could be considered in subsequent
prosecutions for the purpose of enhancing the fines imposed on repeat offenders.
196. Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.010(2) (1986).
197. Id. § 560.016(1)(2).
198. Id. § 558.011(1)(6).
199. Id. § 577.010(2). It should be noted, however, that under § 577.023(13),
an SIS is considered to be a conviction for purposes of the sentence enhancement
statute. See infra note 218 and accompanying text.
200. Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.012(3).
201. Id. § 560.016(1)(3).
202. Id. § 558.011(l)(7).
203. Id. § 577.049(1).
204. Id. Participation in an ARTOP program may only be used one time to
suspend part or all of a sentence. Id.
205. Id. § 577.049(2).
206. Id. § 577.023.




Craig: Craig: DWI Law in Missouri
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1987
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
A "prior offender" is a person who has pled or been found guilty of
either a DWI or a BAC within five years of a previous intoxication-related
conviction.203 The second conviction within a five year period is a class A
misdemeanor,9 punishable by a fine of up to $1,00010 and/or a term of
imprisonment not to exceed 1 year. 21' The court is not permitted to "suspend
the imposition of sentence... nor sentence such person to pay a fine in lieu
of a term of imprisonment ... nor shall such person be eligible for parole
or probation until he has served a minimum of forty-eight hours consecutive
imprisonment, unless... [he] performs.., at least 40 hours of community
service .... ',212
The term "persistent offender" refers to a person who has pled or been
found guilty of two or more intoxication-related offenses within the previous
ten years .2 1 The third or subsequent conviction within a 10 year period is a
class D felony.21 4 The defendant is subject to a fine of up to $5,00025 and/
or a term of imprisonment not to exceed 5 years.21 6 The court is not permitted
to suspend sentence or permit payment of a fine in lieu of imprisonment. 21 7
It is important to note what constitutes a conviction for purposes of the
sentence enhancement statute. The statute provides that a plea or finding of
guilty, followed by a suspended imposition or execution of sentence is to be
treated as a prior conviction. 218 Case law indicates that a prior conviction in
which the defendant neither had nor waived counsel cannot be "counted"
under the sentence enhancement statute if it would lead to the imposition of
imprisonment.219 It has also been held that municipal and county violations
are not to be considered for purposes of the enhancement statute.
208. Id. § 577.023(1)(3).
209. Id. § 577.023(2).
210. Id. § 560.016(1)(1).
211. Id. § 558.011(1)(5).
212. Id. § 577.023(2). The statute does not prohibit a court from suspending
the execution of a sentence.
213. Id. § 577.023(1)(2).
214. Id. § 577.023(3).
215. Id. § 560.011(1)(1).
216. Id. § 558.011(l)(4).
217. Id. § 557.023(3).
218. Id. § 557.023(13); see State v. Acton, 665 S.W.2d 618 (Mo. 1984) (en
banc) (upholding constitutionality of treating suspended imposition of sentence as a
conviction for purposes of sentence enhancement statute); see also State v. Lynch,
679 S.W.2d 858 (Mo. 1984) (en banc). In Lynch, the court discussed the "Catch-22"
nature of the use of a suspended imposition of sentence (SIS) for purposes of the
sentence enhancement statute. The court noted that a defendant has no right to appeal
an SIS despite the fact that an SIS "carries with it the stain of certain undesirable
attributes of a conviction, such as use for enhancement of punishment." Lynch, 679
S.W.2d at 861.
219. See supra notes 183-89 and accompanying text.
220. A.B. v. Frank, 657 S.W.2d 625 (Mo. 1983) (en banc). For further dis-
cussion, see supra notes 190-95 and accompanying text.
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II. ADnmmTRATnvE TiRATmENT OF INTOXICATION OFFENSES.
As previously noted, administrative proceedings arising out of a DWI
or BAC arrest are for the most part independent of any criminal charges
which may result. 22t Even if the criminal charges are dropped or the defendant
is acquitted, the State is not precluded from revoking a person's license for
refusing to submit to chemical analysis,m2 or for a chemical test indicating
a blood alcohol level of .13 percent or higher.?
A. License Revocation for Refusal of Chemical Testing.
Under Missouri's "implied consent law," a person arrested for a DWI
or BAC has a statutory right to refuse chemical analysis of his blood alcohol
level.? The exercise of this right, however, is not without consequences. If
the arresting officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person was
driving while in an intoxicated condition, he may submit a sworn report to
the Director of Revenue that such person refused the requested test(s).? The
person's driver's license will then be revoked for a period of one year.?
6
Upon request, a post-revocation hearing is available.? 7 The issues at this
hearing are limited to: (1) whether the person was arrested; (2) whether there
221. E.g., Strode v. McNeil, 725 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Askins
v. James, 642 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Duncan v. Safety Responsibility
Unit, Dep't of Revenue, 550 S.W.2d 619, 622 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977). But see infra
notes 296-325 and accompanying text (discussion of license suspensions and revoca-
tions based upon "points" assessed following convictions).
222. Tolen v. Missouri Dep't of Revenue, 564 S.W.2d 601, 602 (revocation
pursuant to Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.041); see infra notes 224-62 and accompanying
text.
223. Mo. REv. STAT. § 302.505(3) (1986) provides that "[t]he disposition of
[the] criminal charges shall not affect any suspension under this section." See Strode
v. McNeill, 725 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (revocation pursuant to Mo.
Rnv. STAT. §§ 302.500-.540); infra notes 263-295 and accompanying text.
224. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 577.020(1), .041(1) (1986); see supra notes 113-29 and
accompanying text.
225. Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.041(1) (1986); see also Senn v. Director of Revenue,
674 S.W.2d 43 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) ("arresting officer" need not be the one who
originally apprehended the suspect); Walker v. Goldberg, 588 S.W.2d 83 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1979) (affidavit not void despite fact that notary was not present when signed).
226. Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.041(1) (1986). In addition, under the revised version
of this statute, evidence of the refusal may be introduced at the person's criminal
trial.
227. id. § 577.041(2). The constitutionality of the summary suspension pro-
cedures was upheld in Blydenburg v. David, 418 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. 1967) (en banc).
The court reasoned that driving was a privilege, not a right; therefore, revocation of
a driver's license "without notice or a hearing does not deprive the licensee of his
property without due process of law, so long as the licensee is given the right of
appeal or review of the suspension or revocation." Id. at 290.
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were reasonable grounds to believe the person was driving in an intoxicated
condition; and (3) whether the person refused to submit to the requested
test(s), 8 The State has the burden of proof on all three issues and must
present its evidence first.229 Because it is a civil proceeding, the corpus delicti
ruleP" does not apply. Therefore, extrajudicial statements or admissions by
the licensee may be admitted to aid the State's case. 2 1
At the hearing, the state must first establish that the person had been
placed under arrest." 2 This is because an "arrest" is necessary for the implied
consent law to arise.2" Disputes are likely to center on the second and third
issues: specifically, whether there were reasonable grounds to believe that the
person was driving while intoxicated, and whether the person refused a proper
request to submit to chemical testing. The second issue raises many of the
same questions discussed in the previous section on criminal treatment of
intoxication offenses. The State must show that the officer reasonably be-
lieved that the defendant was the person driving the vehicle," 4 that he was
intoxicated, 2" and further, that he drove while in this condition. 2 6
228. Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.041(2) (1986); see also Askins v. James, 642 S.W.2d
383, 385 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
229. E.g., Postlewait v. Missouri Dep't of Revenue, 643 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1982) (driving privileges ordered reinstated because State failed to present
any evidence on "the disputed requirement of refusal to take the test"); Askins, 642
S.W.2d at 385 ("if there is a negative finding of any one of the three requirements,
the revocation cannot stand").
230. See supra notes 45-62 and accompanying text.
231. Tolen v. Missouri Dep't of Revenue, 564 S.W.2d 601, 602 (Mo. Ct. App.
1978) (due to the civil nature of the proceedings, the standard of proof required is
only preponderance of the evidence); see also Tuggle v. Director of Revenue, 727
S.W.2d 168, 169-70 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Montesano v. James, 655 S.W.2d 137, 139
(Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
232. Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.041(2)(1) (1986).
233. Id. § 577.020(1); see also supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text. In
Collette v. Director of Revenue, 717 S.W.2d 551 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986), the court
ordered that the petitioner's license be reinstated because there had not been a lawful
arrest. The court stated that "[a] refusal [of chemical testing] without a prior arrest
does not meet the requirements of [§ 577.041]." Id. at 557.
The Collette court expressed some frustration with the requirement of an arrest
to trigger the implied consent law. The court was concerned that law enforcement
officers would be hampered in situations where a suspect would be "in such poor
condition that understanding of an arrest might not be possible." Id. at 558. The
legislature addressed this problem, however, in Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.033 (1986),
which provides that a person is deemed to consent if he is incapable of refusing a
blood alcohol test. In addition, it does not appear that a person must subjectively
understand he is under arrest in order to have a valid arrest. For a thorough discussion
of arrest requirements, see State v. Ikerman, 698 S.W.2d 902, 904-06 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985). For further discussion of Collette, see supra note 71.
234. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 73-86 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 35-44, 63-67 and accompanying text.
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Case law indicates that the most litigated issue at post-suspension hear-
ings is whether the person "refused" to submit to chemical testing. To begin
with, there must have been a proper request made by the police officer. 7
Such request must include the officer's reasons for asking the person to
submit to the test,28 and additionally must inform the suspect that his license
may be revoked if he refuses.2?9 Under the new version of section 577.041,
the officer must also tell the person that evidence of his refusal may be used
against him at trial. 4 No particular words are required to be recited in order
to constitute a proper request or warning. 241 It might also be noted that the
officer is not required to warn the suspect of the possible consequences of
submitting to chemical testing. 2
"Refusal" has been defined as the "volitional failure to do what is
necessary in order that the test can be performed.... ."23 For example,
237. Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.041 (1986); see In re Purvis, 591 S.W.2d 29, 30(Mo. Ct. App. 1979); see also Boiling v. Schaffner, 488 S.W.2d 212, 215 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1972) (a request "lies somewhere between a peremptory demand and a polite
invitation").
238. Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.041(1) (1986); see also In re Green, 511 S.W.2d
129, 134 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974) (not required to "recount all of the 'factors' or
circumstances... which in toto gave rise to the officer's opinion that appellant was
driving while intoxicated"); Boiling, 488 S.W.2d at 215-16 (sufficient "reasons" given
by statements that suspect was under arrest for DWI and that the test would determine
the person's blood alcohol content).
239. Mo. Ruv. STAT. § 577.041(1) (1986); see also Postlewait v. Missouri Dep't
of Revenue, 643 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (warning is required by statute;
therefore license ordered reinstated because State presented no evidence that arresting
officer warned arrestee of the consequences of refusal); Sell v. Goldberg, 601 S.W.2d
665, 666 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) ("warning that refusal to take the test 'may,' 'might,'
or 'could' result in a revocation" held sufficient).
In State v. Hanson, 493 S.W.2d 8, 12 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973), the court stated
that "[w]hether the warning ... was given, and whether the defendant was in a
rational condition, were ... matters of fact for the trial court's decision." Id. Hanson
appears to be the only case which mentions the mental condition of the defendant
at the time of the warning.
240. Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.041(1) (1986).
241. E.g., Sell, 601 S.W.2d at 666; Boiling, 488 S.W.2d at 215.
242. Collins v. Director of Revenue, 691 S.W.2d 246, 252 (Mo. 1985) (en banc)
("Nothing in [§ 577.041(1)] requires the officer to inform the defendant of the mul-
tiplicity of consequences which might occur if the driver submits to the examina-
tion."). One possible consequence of submitting to testing is license revocation or
suspension if the test indicates a blood alcohol level of .13% or higher under §§
302.500-.540.
243. Spradling v. Deimeke, 528 S.W.2d 759, 766 (Mo. 1975). The court elab-
orated, stating: "Whether the declination is accomplished by verbally saying, 'I re-
fuse,' or by remaining silent and just not breathing or blowing into the machine, or
by vocalizing some sort of qualified or conditional consent or refusal, does not make
any difference .... " Id.; see also Rains v. Director of Revenue, 728 S.W.2d 649
(Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
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blowing around the mouthpiece of the breathalyzer machine has been held
to constitute a refusal.2 " Inadvertent behavior, however, such as smoking
before being warned that it might affect the test results, has been held not
to be a refusal.24
A person can also "refuse" by inaction, or by giving a qualified or
conditional consent.2" Nonetheless, it appears that some equivocation is per-
mitted if it is based upon a legitimate right which the suspect has.2 7 A person
should be given a reasonable amount of time to decide whether to submit
to testing.248 In addition, a suspect has the right to consult with an attorney
or other person prior to deciding whether to consent. 249 Therefore, condi-
tioning consent upon talking to an attorney is not a refusal so long as it will
not unreasonably delay the test.20 This right to consult with counsel, how-
ever, does not extend to having a court appointed attorney; such a demand
has been held to amount to a refusal.Y In addition, the arrestee does not
have the right to choose which test(s) to which he will submit. 2 2 If he insists
on an alternative test, he will be found to have refused.32 Intentional delaying
tactics may also be deemed to be a refusal.254
244. Askins v. James, 642 S.W.2d 383, 386 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); see Deimeke,
528 S.W.2d at 766; see also Stewart v. McNeill, 703 S.W.2d 97, 99 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985) (intentional "failure to supply a sufficient breath sample" constituted a refusal).
245. E.g., Arnold v. Director of Revenue, 593 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Mo. Ct. App.
1980) ("no proof that petitioner knew by experience, admonition or otherwise that
his smoking had any effect or indeed any rational connection with the chemical test
to be administered"); see also Hester v. Spradling, 508 S.W.2d 194 (Mo. Ct. App.
1974).
246. E.g., Deimeke, 528 S.W.2d at 766; Curry v. Goldberg, 614 S.W.2d 318,
319 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Walker v. Goldberg, 588 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Mo. Ct. App.
1979). But cf. In re Purvis, 591 S.W.2d 29, 30 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) ("there must be
an unequivocal refusal to take the test").
247. E.g., Duncan v. Safety Responsibility Unit, Dep't of Revenue, 550 S.W.2d
619, 622 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
248. In Curry, 614 S.W.2d at 319-20, the court determined that 19 minutes
was a reasonable amount of time within which to make a decision.
249. See supra notes 169-75 and accompanying text.
250. E.g., Dain v. Spradling, 534 S.W.2d 813 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (if police
fail to honor a request to consult with an attorney, the suspect has not "refused"
chemical testing); Gooch v. Spradling, 523 S.W.2d 861 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (request
to speak to attorney does not constitute a refusal); see also Hester v. Spradling, 508
S.W.2d 194 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974); Thomas v. Schaffner, 448 S.W.2d 319 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1969). But c.f. In re Purvis, 591 S.W.2d at 30 (court upheld finding of refusal
where arrestee conditioned his consent upon being able to confer with his attorney
in room with door closed).
251. Curry, 614 S.W.2d at 319.
252. Kiso v. King, 691 S.W.2d 374 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
253. Id. at 377.
254. In Rogers v. King, 684 S.W.2d 390 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984), the court found
that the arrestee "refused" by trying to delay the test. The arrestee requested a drink
34
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There does not appear to be any acceptable justification for refusing to
take a breathalyzer test following a lawful request by a police officer.25 In
Duncan v. Director of Revenue,26 the suspect admitted he was intoxicated
at the time of arrest and told the officer, "there was no need" to take the
test. The court held that there was a "volitional declination" to take the test
and upheld the one year license revocation for refusal of the chemical test.
257
The Duncan court reasoned that the purpose of the revocation statute "is
not . . . to allow the police to gain evidence" for later use in a criminal
prosecution.2 8
Early case lav held that the purpose of the revocation statute was to
protect the public and "to punish those guilty of the offense of driving while
intoxicated."' 59 Later cases, however, have expressly disclaimed any punitive
purpose and rely instead on the goal of public safety.m Unfortunately, Mis-
souri courts have not yet explained how the public is protected by the one
year revocation of a person's license for refusing chemical testing.261 Although
evidence of refusal is now admissible at trial, the refusal itself is not wrongful
and should not be used to create an inference of guilt. 262
of water and further asked to go to the bathroom. See also Walker v. Goldberg, 588
S.W.2d 83 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (court upheld the finding of a refusal where arrestee
agreed to take the test, but stayed in his seat for 30 to 45 minutes disputing entries
on the Alcohol Influence Report Form).
255. See supra notes 113-15, 120-26 and accompanying text.
256. 550 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
257. Id. at 621.
258. Id. at 620-21 n.3. One year later, in Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1
(1978), the Supreme Court expressly approved such a statutory purpose, pointing out
that revocation statutes provide "strong inducement to take the breath-analysis test
and thus effectuates the [state's] interest in obtaining reliable and relevant evidence
for use in subsequent criminal proceedings." Id. at 18.
259. Boiling v. Schaffner, 488 S.W.2d 212, 217 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
260. Tolen v. Missouri Dep't of Revenue, 564 S.W.2d 601, 602 (Mo. Ct. App.
1978). The independent nature of the criminal and administrative proceedings made
it necessary for the courts to disavow the punitive aspect of the revocation for refusal
to submit to chemical testing. This enables the State to revoke a non-cooperative
arrestee's license even if he is later acquitted of any criminal charges arising out of
the incident.
261. The U.S. Supreme Court in Mackey, outlined several ways in which public
safety was served by the revocation: "[A]s a deterrent to drunken driving ... it
provides a strong inducement to take the breath-analysis test... [and] in promptly
removing such drivers from the road." 443 U.S. at 18. However, as Justice Stewart
pointed out in his dissenting opinion, "The suspension penalty itself is ... not an
emergency measure to remove unsafe drivers from the roads . . . the critical fact that
triggers the suspension is noncooperation with the police, not drunken driving." Id.
at 20, (Stewart, J., dissenting).
262. Mo. Ray. STAT. § 577.041 (1986) permits the State to introduce evidence
of refusal at trial. Persons suspected of DWI, however, still have a statutory right
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B. License Suspension/Revocation for Blood Alcohol Level Over
.13 Percent
As noted in the previous section, if a person refuses a lawful request to
submit to chemical testing, his driver's license may be revoked for one year.23
If the person consents to the test, however, and if the results indicate a blood
alcohol level of .13 percent or higher, he may be subject to a special sus-
pension/revocation law outlined in sections 302.500 to .540.264 The police are
not required to warn arrestees of this possibility. 2S The purpose of the statute
has been said to be to "expeditiously remove the most dangerous drunk
drivers from Missouri roadways." 266 A suspension/revocation [hereinafter
referred to as suspension] under this statute is independent of any criminal
proceedings or penalties which might arise out of the same incident. 267
The special suspension proceedings are triggered when a person has been
arrested for a DWI or BAC offense, and subsequent chemical testing shows
a blood alcohol level of .13 percent or more.268 If the results are available
to refuse chemical testing. Id.
The court in City of St. Joseph v. Johnson, 539 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. Ct. App.
1976), wrote: "A defendant accorded a right by statute should not be required to
explain the exercise of that right nor should it be used to create an inference of his
guilt." Id. at 787. The court also pointed out that "a motorist must make his choice
to refuse or submit in the atmosphere of his arrest and restraint .... [T]he refusal
may result equally from rational causes of disquiet as from a consciousness of guilt."
Id. (citations omitted). Although there have not yet been any cases under the new
statute, it would seem that refusal evidence should be admitted for the limited purpose
of explaining the absence of blood alcohol test results.
263. See supra notes 224-62 and accompanying text.
264. Mo. Rlv. STAT. §§ 302.500-.540 (1986). The constitutionality of these
sections has been upheld by the Missouri Supreme Court. See Stewart v. Director of
Revenue, 702 SW.2d 472 (Mo. 1986) (en banc) (upheld against claim that statute
was impermissibly vague, and equal protection and due process challenges); Collins
v. Director of Revenue, 691 S.W.2d 246 (Mo. 1985) (en banc) (upheld against an
equal protection challenge).
265. Collins, 691 S.W.2d at 252 ("Nothing in [§ 577.041(1)] requires the ar-
resting officer to inform the defendant of the multiplicity of consequences which
might occur if the driver submits to the examination").
266. Id. In Collins, the court reasoned that "the proportion of people whose
driving ability is impaired and the extent of that impairment rises with increasing
blood-alcohol levels." Id. at 250; see also Stewart v. Director of Revenue, 702 S.W.2d
472, 475 (Mo. 1986) (en banc); Vetter v. King, 691 S.W.2d 255 (Mo. 1985) (en banc).
267. Mo. REV. STAT. § 302.505(3) (1986) provides that "the determination...
by the department [of revenue] is independent ... of any criminal charges arising
out of the same occurrence. The disposition of those criminal charges shall not affect
any suspension or revocation under this section."
268. Mo. REv. STAT. § 302.505(1) (1986). There are two special rules regarding
the charges and circumstances of arrest which should be noted. First, § 302.510(3)
provides that a county or municipal violation cannot be the basis for a suspension
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while the person is still in custody, the police officer will take the person's
license and issue him notice of the suspension and a fifteen day temporary
permit.219 At the same time, the licensee should receive a form which outlines
his rights and responsibilities, including the right to a hearing.270 If the test
results are not immediately available, the Department of Revenue will mail
the notice to the licensee following receipt of the officer's verified report. 271
Upon receiving notice of a suspension, the person has fifteen days to
request an administrative hearing. Absent a timely request for a hearing, the
Department's determination is final.272 A temporary driving permit will be
issued pending the review.27 3 The hearings are conducted by licensed attorneys
who are employed by the Department of Revenue,2 74 and these attorneys may
constitutionally serve as both the prosecutor and hearing officer.275
On review of the suspension, the State has the burden of proof on two
issues: (1) that the licensee was arrested upon probable cause of a DWI or
BAC offense, and (2) that chemical testing showed a blood alcohol level of
.13 percent or higher. 276 The State may choose to rely upon the Department
of Revenue files and the officer's verified report in order to meet its burden. 277
This procedure has been held not to violate the licensee's rights of confron-
under this section unless the arresting officer was an elected official or was "certified"
under §§ 590.100 to .150. See Ashline v. Director of Revenue, 707 S.W.2d 432, 433
(Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (reinstatement of license because no proof offered that arresting
officer had been certified under Chapter 590). Second, under § 302.510(4), if the
arrest was made at a roadblock, it cannot be used to suspend a license under this
section unless there was probable cause for the arrest prior to the stop.
269. Mo. REv. STAT. § 302.520(1), (2) (1986). Although the statute is framed
in mandatory language, the officer may delay delivery of the notice of suspension.
Tuggle v. Director of Revenue, 727 S.W.2d 168 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
270. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 302.520(2) (1986).
271. Id. § 302.515. Section 302.510(1) outlines what is to be included in the
verified report. The police, however, are not held to strict compliance with the stat-
utory requirements. See, e.g., Bennett v. Director of Revenue, 705 S.W.2d 118, 120
(Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (valid report despite absence of natural seal).
272. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 302.505(2), .525(1), .530(1) (1986).
273. Id. § 302.530(2).
274. Id. § 302.530(3).
275. Dove v. Director of Revenue, 704 S.W.2d 713, 715 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
The Dove court stated that administrative hearings do not need "to be conducted in
all instances by an impartial arbiter .... It is enough to satisfy due process require-
ments if judicial review of the administrative decision is provided." Id.; see also
Bradley v. McNeill, 709 S.W.2d 153, 155-56 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
276. E.g., Stewart v. Director of Revenue, 702 S.W.2d 472, 475 (Mo. 1986)
(en banc); Mo. REv. STAT. § 302.530(4) (1986).
277. Leach v. Director of Revenue, 705 S.W.2d 125, 127 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
In addition, the licensee's extrajudicial statements or admissions may be considered
since it is a civil proceeding and the corpus delicti rule does not apply. E.g., Tuggle
v. Director of Revenue, 727 S.W.2d 168, 169 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); see also supra
notes 45-62, 230-31 and accompanying text.
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tation and cross examination because he has the right to subpoena and call
witnesses if he decides to do so.278
A considerable amount of case law has developed over the issue of the
probable cause necessary for the underlying arrest. A number of lower courts
had read section 302.505(1) literally and interpreted the statute as requiring
probable cause at the time of arrest that the person was driving with a blood
alcohol level of .13 percent or higher.279 Such a reading, however, has been
repeatedly rejected; there need only have been probable cause for a DWI or
BAC arrest.2 0 The courts have stated that probable cause exists where there
has been a traffic violation or unusual driving pattern which justifies the
initial stopping of the motorist.2' If the police contact was initiated as part
of a roadblock, the suspension statute does not apply unless there was prob-
able cause for the arrest prior to the stop. 2
278. Stewart, 702 S.W.2d at 475 (citing Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 536.070(2), .077
(1986)). It might be noted that the court also cited to its decision in Vetter v. King,
691 S.W.2d 255 (Mo. 1985) (en banc). It is likely, however, that the court intended
to refer to the companion case of Collins v. Director of Revenue, 691 S.W.2d 246,
254-55 (Mo. 1985) (en banc).
279. The "literal interpretation" is easily reached by a plain reading of the
statute. Mo. REv. STAT. § 302.505(1) (1986) provides: "The department shall suspend
or revoke the license of any person upon its determination that the person was arrested
upon probable cause to believe he was driving a motor vehicle while the alcohol
concentration in the person's blood or breath was [.13%] or more by weight of
alcohol in his blood ... ." It should be noted that there is no reference to a DWI
or BAC standard of probable cause in the statute.
The literal interpretation was urged by Justice Rendlen in his dissenting opinions
in Collins, 691 S.W.2d at 255, and Vetter, 691 S.W.2d at 258. Justice Welliver
concurred with Justice Rendlen in both cases. In interpreting the statute, the dissenting
Justices indicated that an officer must have probable cause to believe that a suspect
was "more than mildly intoxicated at the time of arrest." Vetter, 691 S.W.2d at 258.
280. E.g., Stewart, 702 S.W.2d at 475; Collins, 691 S.W.2d at 251-52; Vetter,
691 S.W.2d at 257; see also Schranz v. Director of Revenue, 703 S.W.2d 912, 912-
13 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (sufficient probable cause where licensee found "passed out"
in driver's seat, had bloodshot eyes, slurred speech); McNeill v. Wallace, 699 S.W.2d
534, 535 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (although no field sobriety tests performed, officer's
observations sufficient to prove probable cause).
281. In Isom v. Director of Revenue, 705 S.W.2d 116 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986),
the licensee disputed the officer's assertion that he had been speeding. The court
stated that if the licensee was not speeding, "there was no probable cause to stop
him and the conditions requisite to a license suspension under §§ 302.500-.540 ...
were not satisfied. .. ." Id. at 117. The court also stated that "[p]roof after the fact
that the subject exhibited conditions associated with intoxication is not enough." Id.;
see also Dalton v. McNeill, 713 S.W.2d 26, 29 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (Dalton found
"passed out" in car in fast food drive-thru lane; held sufficient probable cause to
"stop" the suspect); Schranz, 703 S.W.2d at 912-13 (petitioner hit a building and
was found "passed out" behind wheel; held sufficient probable cause).
282. Mo. REv. STAT. § 302.510(4) (1986). Of course, the licensee may still be
prosecuted on the criminal charges for DWI or BAC.
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The State also has the burden of proving that chemical analysis revealed
that the licensee had a blood alcohol level of .13 percent or higher. 283 In
order for the test results to be considered valid, evidence must be presented
that the test was administered by a qualified person in accordance with
division of health procedures. 2s" The licensee is of course free to challenge
the test results and may present evidence of a deviation from the required
procedures or of a malfunction of the equipment.2 5
Following an adverse decision at the administrative level, the licensee
has fifteen days to petition for a trial de novo in the circuit court.216 The
procedure is exclusive and may not be circumvented by an action for in-
junctive relief against enforcement of the suspension.2 7 It should be also
noted that the license suspension is not stayed by the filing of the suit.2us
However, if the licensee has no "alcohol related enforcement contacts" 28 9
283. E.g., Stewart, 702 S.W.2d at 475.
284. Jannett v. King, 687 S.W.2d 252, 253-54 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). In Jannett,
the court stated that the testing methods and conditions must comply with the leg-
islative standard for admissibility of test result evidence found at Mo. REv. STAT. §§
577.020, .026 (1986). These statutes "have equal applicability whether the proceeding
is criminal or civil ... ." Id. at 254; see Burr v. Director of Revenue, 707 S.W.2d
430, 431-32 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (reinstatement of license because the State failed
to present evidence that officer was certified to administer test, and no evidence as
to what procedures were followed); Felber v. Director of Revenue, 720 S.W.2d 452
(Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (breathalyzer results held inadmissible because no evidence as
to what machine was used). But see Elkins v. Director of Revenue, 728 S.W.2d 567
(Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (possession of valid permit is not necessary if the officer testifies
that he is "qualified").
285. See Jannett, 687 S.W.2d at 254 (absent evidence of malfunction, the State
is not required to "establish that the instrument is free from defects"). For a dis-
cussion of challenging breathalyzer results, see supra notes 152-68 and accompanying
text.
286. Mo. Rv. STAT. §§ 302.530(6), .535(1) (1986); see Dove v. Director of
Revenue, 704 S.W.2d 713, 715 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (the proceeding is not a review
or appeal of the administrative decision); McNeil v. Gardner, 715 S.W.2d 928 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1986) (burden is again on the State to make a prima facia case).
Mo. REv. STAT. § 302.535(1) (1986) also states: "The case shall be decided by
the judge sitting without a jury." The constitutionality of this provision was upheld
in Simpson v. Director of Revenue, 710 S.W.2d 25, 26 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
287. Bradley v. McNeill, 709 S.W.2d 153, 156 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (the stat-
utory scheme provides an adequate legal remedy).
288. Mo. REv. STAT. § 302.535(2) (1986); see State ex rel. King v. Kinder, 690
S.W.2d 408, 409 (Mo. 1985) (en banc) (circuit court is without authority to stay the
suspension).
289. "Alcohol related enforcement contacts" is defined in § 302.525(3) as "any
suspension or revocation under sections 302.500 to 302.540, any suspension or rev-
ocation entered in this or any other state for a refusal to submit to chemical testing
under an implied consent law, and any conviction. .. for a violation which involves
driving a vehicle while having an unlawful alcohol concentration." Mo. REv. STAT.
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within the previous five years, he will be issued a restricted driving permit.29°
The length of the suspension period depends upon the licensee's driving
record. If there have been no "alcohol related enforcement contacts" 291 within
the preceding five years, the person will be subject to a thirty day suspension,
followed by sixty days of restricted driving privileges. 292 The person's license
will be revoked for one year, however, if there have been any alcohol related
suspensions or convictions within the prior five years. 293
The Missouri legislature anticipated the possibility that multiple license
suspensions could result from a single arrest. Section 302.525(4) deals with
this problem and provides that in such a situation, the suspension under
section 302.500 et seq may be "credited" against any other suspension im-
posed; the total period of suspension will be equal to the longer of the two
penalties. 2 4 Prior to reinstatement of his driving privileges, the licensee will
be required to complete an alcohol or drug related traffic offender program
[ARTOP] .295
C. License Suspension/Revocation for Points Following
Conviction
1. First Offenses-License Suspension.
Upon conviction for any moving traffic violation, the Director of Rev-
enue will assess "points" against the person's driver's license. 296 A first of-
fense DWI will result in eight points against the licensee.29 In general, an
§ 302.525(3) (1986).
Note that under the latter part of the definition, it could be argued that some
DWI convictions would not be included because proof of a specific blood alcohol
level is not required for conviction. For example, section 577.010, the DWI statute,
refers only to an "intoxicated" condition. Id. § 577.010.
290. Id. § 302.535(2). Restricted driving permits may only be used to drive "in
connection with the petitioner's business, occupation, employment, or formal pro-
gram of secondary, postsecondary or higher education." Id. If the licensee has had
prior alcohol related enforcement contacts within the preceding five years, the de-
partment has discretion in issuing the restricted permit. Id.
291. See supra note 289.
292. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 302.525(2)(1) (1986). Prior to issuance of the restricted
permit, the licensee is required to file proof of financial responsibility in accordance
with Chapter 303. Id.
293. Id. § 302.525(2)(2).
294. Id. § 302.525(4).
295. Id. § 302.540(1).
296. Id. § 302.302.
297. Id. § 302.302(l)(7). This subsection also applies to a first conviction for
driving under the influence of controlled substances or drugs.
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accumulation of eight points within an eighteen month period will result in
a thirty day suspension of driving privileges. 23 With intoxication related
offenses, however, an additional sixty day period of restricted driving priv-
ileges will be imposed. 299 A BAC conviction will lead to the assessment of
six points against the person's license.3 If the licensee has other points
against him which cause the total number to exceed eight, he will be subject
to the special intoxication related suspension period. 01 It might also be noted
that if the traffic violation resulted in any personal injury or property dam-
age, an additional two points will be assessed against the person's driver's
license.30 2
The propriety of a suspension can be appealed to the circuit court for
a de novo hearing. 0 3 The Director of Revenue is a necessary party to such
proceedings and must be specifically included in the title of the petition. 04
The licensee must file his petition within thirty days of receiving notice of
the suspension; after such time, the court no longer has jurisdiction to hear
the case.303
Upon completion of the suspension period, the person's driver's license
will be reinstated. 306 Prior to this, however, the licensee will be required to
file proof of financial responsibility pursuant to Chapter 303,07 of Missouri's
statutes. This "proof" must be maintained for two years, or the person's
license will be re-suspended. 38
298. Id. § 302.304(2), (3)(1).
299. Id. § 302.304(4). With the restricted driving permit, the licensee may only
drive "between a residence and a place of employment, or to and from an alcohol
education or treatment program" or both. Id.
300. Id. § 302.302(l)(9) (six points will be assessed regardless of whether the
BAC was a state law or county or municipal ordinance violation).
301. Id. § 302.304(4); see supra note 299 and accompanying text.
302. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 302.302(2) (1986).
303. Id. § 302.311.
304. Laiben v. State, 684 S.W.2d 943, 944 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). The court
pointed out that "[ilt is the director in his official capacity and not the Department
of Revenue who is a necessary party to these proceedings." Id. at 945. Because the
Director was not joined, the trial court did not have jurisdiction and the appeal was
dismissed. Id.; see also In re Mulderig, 670 S.W.2d 182, 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984)
("failure of the petitioner to make the Director a party to the action was a jurisdic-
tional defect requiring reversal").
305. Mo. REv. STAT. § 302.311 (1986); see also In re Mulderig, 670 S.W.2d
at 183 ("If the petition is not filed within 30 days, the circuit court has no subject
matter jurisdiction and any relief granted to the petitioner is void.").
306. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 302.304(4), .309(1) (1986). Reinstatement is appro-
priate because suspension involves only the "temporary withdrawal" of driving priv-
ileges. Id. § 302.500(7). Revocations involve "termination" of privileges, and the
person must re-apply for a new license. Id. § 302.500(5).
307. Id. §§ 302.304(4), .309(1).
308. Id. §§ 302.303, .304(5).
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2. Repeat Offenders-License Revocation.
A second or subsequent DWI or BAC conviction, or any combination
of these convictions, will result in twelve points being assessed against the
offender's license.3°9 A person who has accumulated twelve points within a
twelve month period will have his license revoked for one year. 31 0 If such
person fails to file proof of financial responsibility in accordance with Chap-
ter 303, the revocation period will be extended to two years. 1' Because "rev-
ocation" involves the termination of driving privileges,312 the person will be
required to re-take his driving test and apply for a new license. 313
The revocation statute3O1 4 does not provide for any special revocation
period for intoxication related traffic offenders. 3 5 The one year revocation
period applies to anyone who has accumulated twelve points against his
license. 316 Section 302.060, however, has two subsections which restrict the
eligibility of repeat DWI offenders to obtain a new license.
Section 302.060(10) applies to persons with two DWI convictions. The
Missouri legislature recently revised this section, which now provides that:
[t]he director shall not issue any license hereunder: [tlo any person who has
been convicted twice within a five year period of violating the laws of this
state relating to driving while intoxicated .... The director shall not issue
a license to such person for five years from the date such person was con-
victed ... for driving while intoxicated for the second time.317
The new version of section 302.060(10) is unambiguous and should clear up
some of the confusion which had resulted under the old statute. 31 8
309. Id. § 302.302(1).
310. Id. § 302.304(6). This revocation also applies to persons who have ac-
cumulated 18 points in 24 months, or 24 points in 36 months. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. § 302.500(5); see supra note 306.
313. Id. § 302.304(6) (1986).
314. Id. § 302.304.
315. As noted previously, this section does provide for a special suspension
period for such offenders. See supra notes 296-308 and accompanying text.
316. Mo. RPv. STAT. § 302.304(6) (1986).
317. Id. § 302.060(10). It should be noted that this section does not apply to
BAC convictions.
318. The previous version of § 302.060(10) provided that "[tihe director shall
not issue any license hereunder: [t]o any person whose application shows that he was,
within five years prior to such application, convicted for the second time of violating
the laws of this state relating to driving while intoxicated ... ." Mo. Rnv. STAT. §
302.060(10) (1978). In Breeze v. Goldberg, 595 S.W.2d 381 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), the
court held that the five year ineligibility period was not applicable unless the "two
convictions for [DWI] ... occurred within the five year period prior to such appli-
cation." Id. at 383. The two DWI convictions in Breeze had occurred more than five
years apart; therefore, the Director was ordered to reinstate the applicant's license
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Third or subsequent DWI offenders will be subject to section 302.060(9). 3'9
Under this statute, the person will be ineligible to apply for a driver's license
for ten years from the date of his last conviction.312 At the end of such time,
he may petition the circuit court for a review of his conduct since his last
conviction. The court may order that the person be permitted to apply for
a license upon a finding that: (1) "the petitioner has not been convicted of
any offense related to alcohol, controlled substances or drugs ... and [(2)]
that his habits and conduct show him to no longer pose a threat to the public
safety of this state+' '321
The progressive suspension-revocation scheme may be summarized as
follows:
1. First offense DWI-Thirty day suspension, followed by sixty days of
restricted driving privileges. 3""
2. Second offense DWI-
(a) more than five years after first conviction-One year revocation of
driver's license.3
(b) within five years of the first conviction- Ineligible to apply for
license for five years from date of second conviction.3M
since the one year revocation for points under § 302.304(6) had expired.
In the unpublished decision of Burks v. King, No. 36238 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985),
the court determined that the five year ineligibility period should be measured from
the date of the first conviction. Thereafter, the two convictions would not be within
five years of the license application. The Missouri Supreme Court disagreed with this
approach. See Burks v. King, 698 S.W.2d 324 (Mo. 1985) (en banc).
In Messer v. King, 698 S.W.2d 324 (Mo. 1985) (en banc), the Missouri Supreme
Court stated that it did "not agree with [the Breeze] opinion." Id. at 325. Noting
that the "statutory language is crystal clear," the court held that the petitioner "was
convicted of driving while intoxicated within five years of the application [for a new
license]. The conviction.., was a second conviction. By the plain language of the
statute, [he] was ineligible to apply." Id.
Although the court appeared to have stated a rule for all second DWI offenders,
the result in Messer could still be harmonized with Breeze and with the new version
of Mo. REv. STAT. § 302.060(10). The petitioner in Messer had 2 DWI convictions
within five years from the date of the second conviction; accordingly, he should not
have been eligible for a driver's license for five years from the date of his second
conviction. The two convictions of the petitioner in Breeze occurred more than five
years apart; therefore the petitioner could reapply for a driver's license one year after
the second conviction.
It should be noted that the revised § 302.060(10) provides that it is to be applied
retroactively to persons who had been denied licenses under the previous version.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 302.060(10) (1986).
319. Mo. REv. STAT. § 302.060(9) (1986).
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. § 302.304(4); see supra notes 296-308 and accompanying text.
323. Mo. REv. STAT. § 302.304(6) (1986) (revocation for 12 points assessed
following second DWI conviction); see supra notes 309-18 and accompanying text.
324. Mo. REv. STAT. § 302.060(10) (1986).
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3. Third offense DWI-Ineligible to apply for driver's license for ten years
from date of last conviction.325
It should also be noted that administrative revocations cannot be chal-
lenged on the basis of the Director's use of uncounselled convictions. 326 In
criminal trials, uncounselled misdemeanor convictions may not be used to
enhance punishment where imprisonment will be imposed.3 27 This principle
is not applicable to administrative proceedings however, because they are
civil in nature, and the loss of driving privileges is not considered a criminal
penalty. 32 Therefore, the Director may properly use prior uncounselled con-
victions to enhance administrative penalties.
D. Limited Hardship Licenses.
A person whose license has been suspended or revoked may apply to
the circuit court for hardship driving privileges.329 The applicant must show
that he is "required to operate a motor vehicle in connection with his busi-
ness, occupation or employment... [and that] undue hardship ... in earn-
ing a livelihood" would otherwise occur. 330 The application must include a
certified copy of the person's driving record for the prior five years and
proof of financial responsibility under Chapter 303.331 The privilege will be
terminated if the person commits any traffic violation which results in points
being assessed under section 302.302.332
Two classes of intoxication-related offenders are excluded from eligibility
under the hardship license statute. First, the license is not available to a
person who has had his license revoked more than once in the preceding five
years for refusing to submit to chemical testing.3 3 The second restricted
category has been recently clarified by the legislature. Under section
302.309(3)(5)(a), a hardship license will not be issued to any person "who
has been convicted ... twice within a five-year period of violating the pro-
325. Id. § 302.060(9).
326. Buehler v. Director of Revenue, 716 S.W.2d 310 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986);
White v. King, 700 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
327. White, 700 S.W.2d at 155 (citing Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980));
see supra notes 176-89.
328. See Buehler, 716 S.W.2d at 311 (Baldasar "does not prevent the use of
such earlier uncounselled convictions to increase civil penalties or sanctions, which
do not involve incarceration"); White, 700 S.W.2d at 155 (citing Tolen v. Missouri
Dep't of Revenue, 564 S.W.2d 601, 602 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
329. Mo. REv. STAT. § 302.309 (1986).
330. Id. § 302.309(3)(2).
331. Id. § 302.309(3)(3).
332. Id. § 302.309(3)(4).
333. Id. § 302.309(3)(5)(d). Refusing to submit to chemical testing of blood
alcohol level will result in a one year revocation under § 577.041(1). See supra notes
224-62 and accompanying text.
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visions of section 577.010, RSMo. The director shall not issue a license to
such person for five years from the date such person was convicted for
violating the provisions of section 577.010, RSMo." 334 The revised version
of this statute clearly indicates the legislature's intent and should clear up
some of the confusion which had resulted under the old statute. 335
IV. CONCLUSION
This Comment has attempted to provide an overview of current Missouri
law on the topic of intoxication-related driving offenses. This is a continu-
ously changing area of the law, however, and a "current perspective" is
difficult to maintain. Accordingly, practitioners are cautioned to watch for
new developments on pertinent issues.
SANDY CRAo
334. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 302.309(3)(5)(a) (1986).
335. The prior version of Mo. Rv. STAT. § 302.309(3)(5)(a) provided that a
hardship license would not be issued to a person "[w]ho has been convicted ...
twice within a five-year period of violating the provisions of section 577.010, RSMo."
Mo. REv. STAT. § 302.309(3)(5)(a) (1978). Problems in interpreting the statute resulted
because there was no reference to any time limitations regarding when the two DWI
convictions occurred or when, if ever, such a person could apply for a hardship
license. The new statute answers these questions. See supra note 334 and accompa-
nying text.
In Williams v. Schaffner, 477 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. 1972) (en banc), the statute was
held to flatly prohibit the granting of a hardship license to an applicant with two
DWI convictions. In Smith v. State, 677 S.W.2d 920 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984), the court
relied upon Breeze v. Goldberg, 595 S.W.2d 381 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) and held that
the "two prior convictions must have occurred within a five year period prior to the
application for limited driving privileges before denial can occur." Smith, 677 S.W.2d
at 923. As previously noted, the Missouri Supreme Court in Messer v. King, 698
S.W.2d 324 (Mo. 1985) (en banc), stated that it disagreed with the Breeze decision.
The Messer court noted that Smith followed the reasoning in Breeze, but made no
further comment on the merits of Smith. See supra note 318.
The new version of § 302.309(3)(5)(a) provides that it is to be applied retroac-
tively to persons previously denied a hardship license. Mo. REv. STAT. § 302.309(3)(5)(a)
(1986). It might also be noted that for persons with two DWI convictions within five
years, the amount of time such person is ineligible for both hardship privileges and
a "regular" driver's license is five years from the date of the second conviction. See
Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 302.060(10), .309(3)(5)(a) (1986).
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